In 2007, CUSUR launched an Initiative in order to secure an array of experts in “areas of interest” for the Center and its various forums/proceedings; at the same time, it was hoped that the ‘experts’ might agree to write a series of ‘occasional papers’ to identify “major issues” impacting on US-Ukrainian relations.
As a start, four “areas of interest” were identified: politics-diplomacy, economics, security and the historical-culturological. Once identified, appropriate ‘analytic networks’ were created. CUSUR’s analytic networks, when operating in tandem, came to constitute the “US-Ukraine Working Group”. The Group presently consists of 20 (5 from each sector of analytic interest for CUSUR) government, NGO and academic “specialists” from Ukraine and an equal number of counterparts from the United States (40 individuals in all).
The US-UA WG initiative eventually spawned an interest in creating an informational presence capable of highlighting ‘CUSUR event/conference presentations of particular import’ as well as ‘the mentioned occasional papers’, or more precisely, prompted a determination to establish a bi-annual Journal of Ukrainian Affairs.
Concurrently, the network began contemplating an annual “US-UA Leadership Summit”. As originally envisioned, the gathering was intended to be a venue for focusing attention on the categories of interest named in the US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Charter (and incidentally reflected exactly in CUSUR’s ‘analytic sectors’). The effort’s ultimate objective was to find or suggest ways to strengthen ties between the two countries in the near and far future.
The event planned to involve the participation of all 20 of the ‘experts’ from the US side associated with the US-UA Working Group as well as their 20 counterparts from the Ukrainian side. It would also include 20 selected guest ‘specialists’ from the CUSUR run Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Future Forum Series (hence, in reality, ‘UA experts’ from EU and Canada). Finally, it would include up to 20 CUSUR patrons (Meczenats) as well as prominent ‘Hromada’ activists (with selection determined ‘by lot’) as ‘invited observers’.
Over time (starting in 2010), the anticipated Summit evolved a new and somewhat different task: to provide a yearly “six subject report card” on Ukraine’s “progress/regress with regard to robust democratic politics, developed market economics, ever greater general security, ever greater energy security, viable social cohesion and an established (yet tolerant) national identity”; its recalibrated goal was “to take accurate measure” of the status of the US-Ukrainian relations going forward. The step was taken because of repeated reports that the prevailing Ukrainian political leadership was ‘backsliding’ in several of the outlined categories (the last two categories—viable social cohesion and established national identity—were, in fact, added to monitor any indication of ‘critical internal or external erosion of UA sovereignty’).
In 2012, a ‘Summit’ dress rehearsal (Ukraine’s ‘Report Card’ on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections) was run as part of the UA Quest for Mature Nation Statehood RT Series—somewhat appropriately given that any ‘backsliding’ would in fact impact on the quest in question.
2013 saw the successful launch of the gathering as a ‘stand-alone’ endeavor under a new ‘brand name’: US‑UA WG Yearly Summit. In 2014, 2015 and again in 2016, CUSUR’s running of the Summit II & Summit III corroborated its commitment to the new series:
- US-Ukraine Working Group Yearly Summit
- US-Ukraine Working Group Yearly Summit II
- US-Ukraine Working Group Yearly Summit III
- US-Ukraine Working Group Yearly Summit IV
The last three mentioned events also confirmed that an ‘annual situational update assessment’ on Ukraine would be necessary even after the ‘backsliding’ UA leadership had been removed by the Euro Maidan’s ‘Revolution of Dignity’ and replaced by a political class committed to full internal reform plus (renewed efforts at) integration into the Euro-Atlantic Community. Given the emerging persistence of Russia’s ‘stealth intrusion’ into Ukraine (indicating that RU might not relent for a long time), steady/regular monitoring of the condition of the Ukrainian state was a ‘must do’ proposition.
In 2017, CUSUR, using US-Ukraine Working Group Yearly Summit V, plans to provide an ‘official report card’ as well as prepare an edited/annotated transcript of the proceedings and distribute the combined material to the various US governmental and non-governmental agencies and institutions that have an interest in Ukraine.
Also please note two US-UA WG YS prequel events: