



American Foreign Policy Council

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*Trip Report*

# Ukraine

## (Poland and Moldova)

January 20-29, 2023







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## NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR

*Ukraine remains resilient in the face of Russia's attempted war of conquest. After almost a year of high-intensity conflict on multiple fronts, Ukraine is determined to restore itself to its constitutional territory. Ukrainians are very grateful for the vital American support they have received but are anxious about political fluctuations in Washington as a major new Russian offensive approaches. The second year of the war will challenge Ukraine as an army, a government and a people, and will challenge America and Europe as well. We believe there should be no turning back in providing Kyiv what it needs; indeed, we should hurry. These are some conclusions from the visit of an American Foreign Policy Council delegation to Kyiv and Odesa for a week of intensive consultations in late January.*

Wayne Merry

*AFPC Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia*



## INTRODUCTION

AFPC has visited Ukraine routinely over the years, but none of our trips there (or elsewhere, for that matter) has been anything like our wartime visit to the capital Kyiv and port city Odesa January 20-29. The absence of civil air connections into Ukraine due to the war required short, but useful, stops in Warsaw on the way into Ukraine by train and in Chisinau on the way out by vehicle. The eight-member delegation was led by Dr. William Schneider, Jr., former Under Secretary of State and AFPC President Herman Pirchner, Jr. (complete delegation list attached). We engaged in a constantly-evolving program of meetings — half a dozen or more per day (list of meetings attached). The program was interrupted by air raids — now a daily experience in urban Ukraine — which deprived the delegation of some much-anticipated encounters. Nonetheless, the five days in Ukraine were among the fullest in the experience of these veteran travelers.

Unlike other recent Washington delegations to Kyiv, our visit was organized directly with Ukrainian counterparts and without involvement of the State Department. Our meetings included senior Ukrainian Government figures in the fields of defense, intelligence, energy and infrastructure, elected Members of the State Rada across the political spectrum plus the mayors of both major cities, diverse representatives of Ukraine's vibrant civil society, victims of Russia's attacks on ordinary communities and citizens, uniformed combatants in the country's struggle for survival, and US ambassadors and embassy staff. In contrast to previous AFPC visits to Ukraine since the onset of Russia's war in 2014, we could not visit the actual battlefield. The previous low-intensity conflict is now a major European war, so Ukrainian authorities understandably were unwilling to expose foreign visitors to the very real dangers of the front lines, and we accepted that Ukraine's soldiers have more demanding and important tasks. Although our visit was limited to the rear areas of this war (air raids excepted), we met with some front-line combatants. Our impressions thus are of Ukraine "in depth" — of the "home front" and its institutions in support of the battlefield.



## AFPC VISITS A UKRAINE AT WAR

### ON-SITE EXPERIENCES

Probably the most memorable event of our trip was a visit to the middle-class Kyiv suburb of Bucha, site of the deliberate massacre of over four hundred local civilians (including children) during the Russian Army occupation of late February through the end of March. The nature and scale of the killings have been well-attested by various international authorities and cannot be credibly disputed. Even though bodies of the victims have all been removed and reburied, a visit to the temporary memorial site in and behind the local church was deeply moving. Given that the killings took place only days after the onset of Russia's attack on northern Ukraine, the very pointlessness of the massacre assures that the name Bucha will live in international memory long after the war itself is exhausted. We were told of reports of many similar massacre sites still behind Russian lines, and that "Putin wants Ukraine without Ukrainians." Local authorities, both civil and clerical, are committed to preserving Bucha's historical memory, parallel as it is to the Holocaust massacre site of Babi Yar only a few miles away. Despite their own suffering, locals emphasized to us that their top priority is to win the war and that all plans for rebuilding and healing depend on victory.

The great city of Kyiv retains its beauty despite some physical damage from air attacks and from fighting early in the war, but its activity level reflects the absence of about half the pre-war population. To a newcomer, the city may appear fairly normal, but it is not. There had been 647 air raid alerts since February. A drive to the US Embassy which in earlier visits would require up to an hour now involves only about half that. A city notable for its vibrant nightlife in the aftermath of both the Orange Revolution

of 2004-5 and Revolution of Dignity of 2014 remains very much alive, but devoid of tourists and very dark after dusk due to Russian deliberate destruction of energy infrastructure and to the need to conserve energy for the battlefield.

### CIVILIAN ENERGY AS TARGET

The Russian air campaign intentionally targets civilian infrastructure — energy, water, heat, transport — rather than just military-related targets with the objective to make much of urban Ukraine unlivable. This is undeniably a campaign against the very population that President Putin has declared to be fraternal and permanently bonded with Russia. Fortunately, the first winter of this war has been relatively mild by Ukrainian standards, allowing life among the reduced city population to proceed, although with constant disruptions and hardships. However, the regular air attacks create serious problems in that complex infrastructure equipment can be damaged or destroyed in an instant but then requires lengthy efforts to restore. This was a major theme in several meetings, in that the Russian bombardment strategy since October is aimed at systematically reducing civilian energy supplies and creating transport bottlenecks to undermine the viability of Ukraine's economy and future. At the time of our visit, some 326 bridges had already fallen victim to the fighting (some early in the fighting at Ukrainian hands to prevent Russian Army advances).

With each air attack, it becomes increasingly difficult to restore energy nodes and other infrastructure. This is an area in need of urgent attention from international donors, as much of the equipment in question can take months to restore or replace, a task well beyond Ukraine's capacity while fighting a major war. Although



*AFPC delegates meet with Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov, National Security Advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Bottom left: Secretary Danilov; Bottom right: AFPC President Herman Pirchner.*

not as newsworthy as the provision of battle tanks, replacements for critical infrastructure are vital for the Ukrainian home front. In addition, more anti-aircraft systems are needed not just to defend Ukrainian ground forces but also the country's key infrastructure from the constant attacks from drones and missiles. Indeed, air attacks on infrastructure have the dual purpose of drawing away air defenses from the battlefield, thus supporting Russian ground forces indirectly. While Ukraine has been fortunate in a mild winter, preparation for the next winter is already overdue. Diversification of energy sources is a

key requirement for foreign support for Ukraine in what could become a long war.

A critical problem is Russian attacks on and occupation of nuclear power stations, which are vital to Ukraine's economy. Russian battle tactics have often sought to make these facilities objects of combat. The role of the Russian firm Rosatom (a state entity) in the management of Ukrainian nuclear energy facilities is a critical vulnerability both for units in areas under Russian occupation and for those in need of replacement nuclear fuel from the West.



### LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Despite the urgency of current maintenance and repairs, a number of our interlocutors were also focused on what they called the “day after tomorrow” in terms of Ukraine’s needs after the war, and presumed victory. Reforms of various kinds have been recurrent themes in Ukrainian politics for the past quarter century, leading to both the Orange and Dignity Revolutions and the dramatic electoral upset which brought Volodymyr Zelensky to power in 2019. However, despite his electoral triumph and brilliant performance as a war leader, Zelensky had been less successful in forging domestic political reforms and, perhaps even more, economic reforms. When Putin unleashed his major campaign last February, Zelensky’s public support was in serious decline, creating some doubts about his future performance when the government will no longer have the powers of martial law and must again engage in open democratic and parliamentary politics. From our

meetings, it is clear that all political factions want to project unity in the face of foreign invasion, but by no means everyone thinks Zelensky and his team would perform as successfully in peacetime. Zelensky, like his predecessors, has tended to prefer a highly centralized governing structure rather than dispersing political powers in this very large and diverse country or encouraging development of institutions closer to voters, much to the consternation of regional and local officials who feel inadequately empowered to run their own jurisdictions as they see fit. Some recent corruption scandals in his administration have accentuated the wartime problem of unaccountable government and the continuing shortcomings of Ukraine’s judicial system.

### CORRUPTION A CONSTANT ISSUE

A topic raised by Ukrainian participants in almost every meeting was the problem of corruption in the public sector and perceptions of it among the Western governments vital to the country’s



*AFPC Delegates outside Church of St. Andrew, located in Bucha, just 18 miles outside of Kyiv. Site of the mass grave at the Church of St. Andrew, following the March 2022 Russian invasion and murder of 458 innocent Ukrainians.*





*AFPC President Herman Pirchner, Jr. exchanges gifts with Odesa Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov Mayor of Odesa following a ninety-minute meeting with the AFPC delegation.*

survival in the current war. No one denied the existence of the problem or the need to eradicate it. Most interlocutors sought to persuade us that the problem of corruption is significantly less than in earlier years, that efforts to weed out corruption are serious and making progress, and that patriotic Ukrainians would not steal from American and European assistance in a war of national survival. The very pervasiveness of the protestations was an indication that Ukrainians are well aware of their national shortcomings in this respect and that their reputation for corruption is a serious problem abroad, especially in Germany where the concept of “Ukraine fatigue” originated.

As it happens, several blatant new cases (some involving food procurement for soldiers) emerged just as our delegation arrived, but Zelensky moved quickly with firings and arrests. A number of interlocutors portrayed this swift action as proof the Zelensky government is actively moving to root out corruption rather than to paper it over. Nonetheless, Ukrainians we

met were keenly aware of the recent controversy in Washington about assistance to Ukraine and accusations (unsupported) that American aid is subject to diversion. Senior investigative teams from Washington were at work in Kyiv during our visit and reportedly found no compromise of US-supplied military and financial aid. A European Union team issued a similar report shortly thereafter.

#### URGENT APPEALS

Among our political interlocutors there were three basic shared themes: expectations of a major Russian military offensive in the coming months, appreciation for US assistance in weapons and money, and urgent appeals and for much more assistance in the immediate future. During our visit, the issue of provision of battle tanks to Ukraine by the United States and Germany was favorably resolved by the White House and German chancellor, at least in principle. However, the urgency felt about deliveries of these weapons and other munitions



cannot be exaggerated, as reflected in such statements as, without US aid “the nation would definitely fall,” “only weapons matter, money is in second place,” “hope is not a good strategy, F-16s are a good strategy.” The decisions to provide the tanks had consumed seven months during which thousands of Ukrainian lives were lost in combat.

Almost all interlocutors emphasized that only victory could end the war, not a ceasefire, that the pre-February 23, 2022, borders are not acceptable, only a restitution of Ukraine’s pre-2014 territory, and that opinion polls show eighty-six percent of Ukrainians want entry into both NATO and the European Union. Several persons emphasized the continual daily losses of Ukrainians in combat (although no one would speculate on how high total losses may now be). The pain of shared personal and societal losses

from nearly a year of savage combat has left emotional scars. One elected politician expressed his feelings simply, as “I want revenge, revenge, revenge, without mercy.”

In our many meetings with government figures, the priorities were similar to those of the politicians combined with assurances that US assistance will not be squandered through waste or corruption, although they noted that in wartime it is difficult to reveal publicly all the efforts underway to combat corruption. There was serious concern that the extended fighting has created sharp inflation in war-related expenditures. For example, the market price of a 155mm artillery shell had zoomed from US\$600 to US\$3,000, at a time when Ukraine’s economy and hence government revenues are struggling with war conditions. Our government interlocutors



*AFPC delegates met with Rada Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence representatives Fedir Venislavskyyi, MP (Servant of the People political party), Head of State Security and Defense Subcommittee; Solomia Bobrovska, MP (Holos political party); and, Major Ihor Gerasymenko. The MPs reinforced the Ukrainian military’s need for western military supplies and discussed the expected spring Russian offensive.*



*Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko met with the delegation in Kyiv City Hall to discuss ongoing concerns regarding the expected Russian spring offensive.*

identified three key priorities in new assistance from the United States: in air defense (such as Patriot missiles), for a new reserve army corp of mechanized brigades (equipped with Bradley Fighting Vehicles), and in more artillery of both 155mm and 105mm to include cluster munitions. Aware of the strong inhibitions in Washington about the provision of cluster munitions, they emphasized how helpful such ammunition could be in current combat circumstances and noted that the United States, Ukraine and Russia are

not signatories to the anti-cluster munitions convention. There were also appeals for F-16 fighters (and some mention of F-15s and even F-35s) and for A-10 attack aircraft, characterized as “flying tanks”, plus longer-range missiles. There was understandable concern that this aid (even if forthcoming) might not arrive in time to counter the anticipated spring Russian offensive, and stress on the importance that the West fulfill its commitments in terms of time as well as content.



Among both political and governmental interlocutors, there was relatively little speculation about current politics inside Russia, and effectively none about a potential settlement of the war short of Ukrainian victory. Curiously, the issue of potential Russian resort to nuclear weapons was by no means prominent in Kyiv where it is not taken as seriously as abroad. There was a perception of deeply engrained imperialism in Russian culture and in Russian institutions and the ruling elite. This creates a pervasive danger not just to Ukraine but to Poland and the Baltic States which cannot be removed without a definitive Russian military defeat. Some saw a power struggle already underway in Moscow for the post-Putin succession as in part a struggle for control of Russia's resources. In parallel, Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán came in for criticism for his perceived willingness to accommodate the Russian attack last February in return for a presumed transfer of a piece of Western Ukraine to Hungary. China was also understood to have expected a swift Russian victory but now to be a close observer of the conflict, with its obvious parallels with its own ambitions toward Taiwan.

#### CIVIL SOCIETY SPEAKS

We met with a wide range of Ukrainian civil society, that dynamic component of the country which perhaps more than any other differentiates today's Ukraine and its politics from Russia. Civil society figures in Kyiv and Odesa are entirely committed to victory and some even characterized themselves as an "armed civil society." A number of veterans of the Maidan struggles of earlier years emphasized that Russia's current war did not start last year but eight years before on the streets of central Kyiv. Indeed, it is the accumulated experience of battle in defense of the Donbas during those years which transformed Ukraine's military into the armed force which astonished the world last year by confronting and defeating Russian invasion efforts. Some of

these veterans now want long-range weaponry which would allow Ukraine to project the war into actual Russian territory which otherwise remains immune from a conflict devastating to much of eastern, southern and central Ukraine. Special operations units are clearly active behind the Russian front lines on Ukrainian territory and some perhaps even inside Russia itself.

Civil society plays a key role in keeping a close eye on its own government which operates with martial law powers and effectively without either legislative or judicial controls. The focus on "the day after" the war is a key priority for civil society groups which have struggled for reforms over several decades, often to be frustrated as each "new Ukraine" government proved to be similar to those before. Civil society is also determined not to allow the Zelensky government to make a compromise peace with Russia. In whatever way this war may end, making peace will challenge the unity of the Ukrainian polity perhaps more than the war itself, which has tended to encourage Ukrainian unity and the integrity of national identity. One interesting debate within civil society is about a post-war war crimes trial to confront Putin and his associates with crimes against humanity and even to expand beyond normal war crimes charges and restore a charge of "crimes against peace" to the Russian leadership, something not done since the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials after the Second World War.

#### CRIMEA AS CENTRAL OBJECTIVE

The status and future of Crimea is an important topic for many of our interlocutors, as Russia's war on Ukraine started there with its seizure in 2014 and must, in the views of most Ukrainians, end with its restoration to Ukrainian sovereignty. Recently, some senior policy voices in Washington and major European capitals have indicated that Kyiv cannot expect Western support in this objective, although several veteran military experts have judged that



*Ukrainian parliamentarians Nikita Poturaev, Chairman of the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy (Servant of People political party), Rostyslav Pavlenko, member of the science and Innovations committee (European Solidarity political party) and Inna Sovesun, Member, Committee on Energy and Utilities (Voice political party) provided a unified message to the delegation insisting that with Western military might, the war can be put to a swift end.*

military recovery of Crimea is within Ukraine’s capacities. The topic of immediate concern in Kyiv is the treatment of Crimea’s Ukrainian population under Russian control, and especially the fate of members of the indigenous population of Crimean Tatars (victims of external oppression many times in the past). Russia is perceived by Tatar representatives in exile as wanting to eliminate the Crimean Tatars altogether in a process which began with the February 2014 annexation of Crimea. We were told that just during the period of our visit there had been Russian police raids on hundreds of Tatar homes in Crimea. In response to Russia’s recent mobilization of men for the conquest of Ukraine, many young Tatars have fled Crimea to locales such as Georgia and beyond in Europe including even Ireland. Reportedly there are a pair of Tatar volunteer units serving in the Ukrainian army to seek the return of Crimea to Kyiv’s control. All Crimean representatives (Tatar and otherwise)

insist on the complete return of Crimea to Ukrainian sovereignty and the departure of all Russians who had migrated to Crimea since 2014. They argued that the early post-Soviet agreement between Moscow and Kyiv to accommodate the Russian Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol had been “a mistake” and would not be part of a return of Crimea to its pre-2014 constitutional status.

#### EXPRESSIONS OF DOUBTS

One senior Ukrainian intelligence official expressed concern that the military situation is “not brilliant at all” as well as with Ukraine’s “extremely high level of dependence on the West.” He noted Ukraine has used up seventy to eighty percent of its Soviet-era military supplies and simply cannot sustain the present tempo of combat. This is especially the case in the depletion of 152mm artillery ammunition (still the main Ukrainian caliber as it transitions to NATO 155mm) and 125mm tank rounds. He saw



*Tamila Tasheva, Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea, briefed the delegation on the status of Crimean Tatars in Crimea and otherwise, and echoed other Ukrainian leaders' insistence on the complete return of Crimea to Ukrainian sovereignty and the departure of all Russians who had migrated to Crimea since 2014.*

a “huge battle” coming soon, potentially creating a new “time of troubles” in Russia (an early Seventh Century period of political and social upheaval linked with foreign wars), because he believes that Putin needs war more than victory. Alternatively, the coming battle could result in a collapse of the Russian invasion. Although he sees the Russian elite as stable, in case of a major

defeat in the war that stability could alter sharply. However, he also believes Russia is ready for a long war lasting through 2024, as Putin’s policy is “insensitive” to losses. In his view, for Russia the war was a mistake but for Putin it was “brilliant” as the large outflow of young and educated people reduces a potential opposition.



Security officials outlined what they saw as four Russian military goals for this year: control of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the end of March; maintain control of the land bridge to Crimea; take Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts in the summer; establish control of the entire left bank of Ukraine by the end of the year. This would be less than the initial agenda when Putin launched the February offensive, but substantially more than Russia could achieve in its first year of large-scale campaigning.

Another senior official maintained that Russian subversion efforts in Ukraine remain robust and produce almost daily arrests by Ukrainian security police. There are constant counter-intelligence efforts underway between the two countries as they both have such large shared ethnic populations which can be used against each other. For example, ten to fifteen percent of the Russian leadership class are of Ukrainian ethnicity, but this says little about their loyalties.

#### ODESA

The Black Sea port city of Odesa is the most important export venue in Ukraine and vital for the grain trade which feeds much of the populations of countries in the Middle East. For that reason, among others, it has been a prime target of Russia's war strategy in an effort to strangle Ukraine's export economy and to create international pressure for a compromise peace at Ukraine's expense. Russian ground forces failed to reach Odesa, and its Navy suffered a spectacular defeat with the sinking of flagship "Moskva" by a Ukrainian anti-ship missile. Since October the Russian air campaign has focused on the city and its surrounding areas and infrastructure, to the extent that half the urban region's energy infrastructure has been destroyed or damaged. Although there has been considerable resort to smaller power and heat generation units, preparations for next winter for this city of a million will require significant repairs and

replacements of equipment and restoration of supplies of both electricity and gas.

Russia initially was able to close off the export of vital grain and only relented under massive international pressure and persuasion by the Turkish government. Still, Russia's continuing air and naval operations have reduced grain export to only thirty percent of normal, with the fate of next year's harvest in doubt.

On January 25, Odesa was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in Danger, a product of Russia's war and deliberate attacks on the great cultural city. This designation was fiercely resisted in Paris by Russian representatives but actively pursued by the city administration and Ukrainian government. The UNESCO vote on the designation demonstrates broad international recognition that Russia's war is not only on distant battlefields but is also targeted on a historic city which Moscow likes to assert is entirely Russian in origins and character.

Looking to the "day after tomorrow," the city government wants to develop Odesa as an international center for cultural dialogue. With its long contributions to both Ukrainian and Jewish literature, Odesa maintains its reputation for humor and as a tough town (its sister city in the US is Baltimore) where there was significant political violence in 2014. More recently, the current mayor was denied a US visa due to allegations of corruption.

The Ukrainian Navy maintains a flotilla HQ in Odesa (the object of a Russian direct air attack at the outset of the current war), in order to try to assure maritime free flow of commerce, but thus far only a political understanding including Russia has left ships coming in and going out, which is thus at Moscow's mercy.

#### NEIGHBORS TO UKRAINE'S WAR

Both Poland and Moldova have experienced



important changes due to the ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine, first and foremost due to massive flows of refugees (ninety percent women and children) fleeing the fighting. Poland opened its doors — literally — to the large number of women, children and elderly coming across the border, as President Duda successfully appealed to his compatriots to provide accommodations for these refugees in their own homes to the tune of nearly two million people. The size of the refugee burden on Poland has fluctuated as many refugees moved on to other opportunities further west or were able to return to their homes in Ukraine. Poland has been the vital transit country for supplies and military equipment into Ukraine, putting the country at risk of Russian retaliation of various kinds. For the time being, Poland’s status as a NATO member has shielded it from physical attack, but the costs of being the hinterland for Ukraine’s defense have been real. That sentiment was expressed by one of our interlocutors who justified sending his own country’s battle tanks next door, saying “We see Ukraine as the front lines of Poland.”

In Moldova (not a NATO member and more distant from the fighting fronts), the refugees from the war were similarly welcomed. Of 750,000 refugees who transited the country, about 100,000 have stayed, ninety percent in private homes. The current pro-reform government has worked closely with the EU toward eventual membership, but it is hampered by “a very shallow bench” of experienced government personnel and the fact that two other participating countries in the EU Eastern Partnership (Ukraine and Georgia) are now actual candidates for EU membership, thus isolating Moldova. As the poorest country in Europe with the second highest rate of inflation, Moldova’s EU prospects are distant and it is constitutionally prohibited from joining NATO. Still, the war has given reforms a jolt as most of the population aspires to European lifestyles. “Bucha scared people.” The government has closed pro-Russian television to prevent subversion and works closely with its Romanian neighbor, an EU and NATO member. The country’s separatist region of Transdniestria has demonstrated no interest in participating in Russia’s war or in closing its common frontier



*The delegation met with Bucha Deputy Mayor Mykhailyna Skoryk-Shkarivska, who discussed the ongoing military needs to protect the Kyiv region as well as the horrors experienced during the mass killing in March 2022.*





with Ukraine. One positive development for Moldova is the presence of five thousand young people who have returned from participation in US Government-sponsored exchange programs, bringing with them very different attitudes than those which had characterized Moldova's quasi-Soviet political culture.

#### ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Russia's war in and on Ukraine challenges the viability and very purpose of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which was created to maintain peace and hence struggles when two of its members are at war. We met senior staff in both Warsaw and Chisinau. With a consensus-based decision structure, Russian policy has made the Organization's budget unsustainable and conveyed that Moscow prefers the "least effective possible" OSCE. On the positive side, Central Asian members have shown increasing interest in the OSCE as an alternative to regional groupings dominated by Russia or China and as a venue for cooperation with Europe and the US. The human rights component of OSCE work brings it directly into Ukraine where there has been some backsliding on human rights commitments under the Zelensky wartime government, although the war has also helped move reforms on accountability and public integrity through the Rada. A future problem is that elections are prohibited under current martial law.

#### AMERICAN ROLE IS CENTRAL

The United States is not only the major Western source for weapons and financial support for Ukraine, it is also very active in encouraging reforms of all kinds, especially in combating corruption. The restored US Embassy in Kyiv (which was abandoned in February at the start of the war) has a five-point agenda: Ukraine to win the war, through military and other aid and cooperation with allies; "win the future" through

fighting corruption and preparing Ukraine for NATO and EU membership; holding Russia to account for its crimes in the war; maintaining full accountability for US aid; and, rebuilding the US mission (which only returned to Kyiv in May). To accomplish these daunting goals, it has a greatly reduced staff of about a hundred personnel, half of whom are engaged in security for the mission. The American assistance program in Ukraine already "dwarfs" the Berlin Airlift, including programs to prepare for "day after tomorrow" Ukraine such as budgetary support for the salaries of six hundred thousand teachers. US policy will not tell Ukraine what its borders should be, but obviously Kyiv cannot make any important decisions about the war or its outcome without considering its vital American partner.

#### CONCLUSION

Our AFPC delegation returned to a Washington much less unified about Ukraine than the very diverse people we met in Kyiv and Odesa (or Warsaw and Chisinau, for that matter). While Moscow still denies it is even engaged in a war, the government and people of Ukraine enjoy the great advantage of clarity of purpose and of action. This is less the case here at home. Ukraine is becoming a dispute in American domestic politics, potentially distracting from clear consideration of the US national interest abroad. In February 2022, the Biden Administration — with very broad bipartisan support in the Congress — introduced a policy of support for Ukraine against blatant and unjustified Russian aggression that can be characterized as "all aid short of war." This has effectively been the American posture during the first year of what may prove to be an extended challenge to Ukraine, to NATO and the EU, and to the United States. We believe this policy is justified. Nothing we saw or heard during our week in Ukraine alters this belief.



## **AFPC DELEGATES**

*\*Delegation Leaders*

**L. Brent Bozell II**, Founder and President, Media Research Center

**Lawrence J. Haas**, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, American Foreign Policy Council

**Mykola Hryckowian**, Director, Washington, DC Office, Center for U.S.-Ukrainian Relations

**E. Wayne Merry**, Senior Fellow for Europe and Eurasia, American Foreign Policy Council

**\*Mr. Herman Pirchner Jr.**, President, American Foreign Policy Council

**\*Dr. William Schneider, Jr.**, Former Under Secretary of State

**Annie Swingen**, Director for External Relations, American Foreign Policy Council

**Hannah Thoburn**, Senior Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations



## MEETING LIST

### Polish Meetings

**Amb. Mark Brzezinski**, U.S. Ambassador to Poland

**Andrzej Dąbrowski**, Advisor to Polish Institute of International Affairs Director

**Dr. Sławomir Dębski**, Director, Polish Institute of International Affairs

**Andrew Gardner**, Deputy Head of the Human Rights Department, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

**Hanna Hopko**, former Head of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada's Committee on Foreign Affairs

**Łukasz Kulesa**, Head of Research, Polish Institute of International Affairs

**Daniel Lawton**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy-Poland

**Agnieszka Legucka**, Russia Analyst, Professor, Polish Institute of International Affairs

**Dr. Paweł Markiewicz**, Head of DC office, Polish Institute of International Affairs

**Cristi Mihalache**, Senior Adviser on Roma and Sinti Issues, Chief of the CPRSI, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

**Fabrizio Nava**, Head of Director's Office, Senior Advisor, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

**Mr. Marcin Przydacz**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

**Kateryna Ryabiko**, First Deputy Director, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

**Alice Szczepanikova**, Adviser on Migration and Freedom of Movement, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

**Konstantine Vardzelashvili**, Head of the Democratization Department, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

### Ukrainian Meetings

**Oleksandra Azarkhina**, Deputy Minister of Infrastructure

**Solomia Bobrovska**, Member of Parliament (Holos political party)

**Alexander Bogomolov**, Director, Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

**Rafat Chubarov**, Chairman of Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People

**Oleksiy Danilov**, Secretary, National Defense and Security Council of Ukraine

**Vitalii Demianiuk**, owner, NT Engineering; Member, Working group on hydrogen economy and new nuclear technologies development, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine

**Mustafa Dzhemilev**, Member of Parliament, former Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People

**Major Ihor Gerasymenko**, National Defense and Security Council of Ukraine

**Mykhaylo Gonchar**, President of the Strategy XXI Center for Global Studies



**Dmytro Grygorev**, DTEC (electricity), Odesa

**Mykhailo Honchar**, Strategy XXI

**Maksym Khlapuk**, Member of Parliament (Holos political party); former Head of GR Department, Naftogaz

**Viktor Khorenko**, Commander, Special Operations Force for Gas supply, Odesa

**Vitaliy Klitschko**, Mayor of Kyiv

**Leonid Krasnyansky**, Odesa Natural Gas Supply

**Ostap Kryvdyk**, Chair, Ukrainian Strategic Initiative

**Sergiy Kvit**, former Minister on Education and Science; former Vice-Rector, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

**Igor Lapin**, former Member of Parliament

**Andriy Levus**, civic leader, former Member of Parliament (2014-19) and former Deputy Head, Security Service of Ukraine (2014)

**Viacheslav Likhachov**, Analyst and member of the Expert Council, Center for Civil Liberties

**Oleksandr Lytvynenko**, Head, Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine

**Oleh Medunytzia**, former Member of Parliament

**Vice Admiral Oleksiy Neyizhpapa**, Commander, Ukrainian Naval Forces of Ukraine

**Volodymyr Ohryzko**, former Minister of Foreign Affairs

**Olena Pavlenko**, Dixi Group

**Rostyslav Pavlenko**, Member of Parliament, Committee on Education, Science and Innovations (European Solidarity political party)

**Oleksandr Polischuk**, Deputy Minister of Defense

**Nikita Poturaev**, Chairman of Parliament, Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy (Servant of People political party)

**Hanna Pozdnyakova**, Heat supply, Odesa

**Oleksandra Romantsova**, Executive Director, Center for Civil Liberties

**Anatoliy Sandurskyi**, Deputy Chairman, Security Council of Ukraine

**Alina Saraniuk**, Head, International Department, Office of the Mayor, Bucha

**Mychailyna Skoryk**, Deputy Mayor of Bucha

**Christopher Smith**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy-Kyiv

**Inna Sovsun**, Member of Parliament, Committee on Energy and Utilities (Voice political party)

**Vadym Storozhuk**, Member of Kyiv City Parliament

**Vadym Storozuk**, Professor, Kyiv National University of Theater, Cinema, and Television

**Tamila Tasheva**, Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea

**Gennady Trukhanov**, Mayor of Odesa

**Volodymyr Vasylenko**, former of Ambassador of Ukraine to the United Kingdom



**Fedir Venislavskyi**, Member of Parliament (Servant of the People political party), Head of State Security and Defense Subcommittee

**Ostap Yednak**, Advisor to the President, Ukrspetsexport

**Andriy Yusov**, spokesperson, Main Intelligence Directorate

### Moldovan Meetings

**Amb. Kelly Keiderling**, Head of OSCE Mission to Moldova

**Amb. Kent D. Logsdon**, U.S. Ambassador to Moldova



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## About AFPC

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