

English language excerpt from a Democratic Initiatives Foundation monograph:

***Ukraine's Place  
in NATO:  
A survey of expert opinion***

*Provided by the Center for US-Ukrainian Relations*

Kyiv  
June 2006



## **Table of Contents**

About	2
Introduction	3
<i>Excerpt: Main Conclusions</i>	
1. NATO membership, Ukraine's national interests and timeframes	5
2. Advantages and benefits of accession process and membership	6
3. Failure to join NATO: consequences and scenarios	9
4.1 NATO stereotype: "aggressive agenda"	13
4.2 NATO stereotype: "accession cost too high"	17
4.3 NATO stereotype: "ruined relations with Russia"	19
5. NATO information campaign components	22
List of experts	30

## About the publication

*Mistse Ukrayiny v NATO: Materialy opytuvannya ekspertiv* was published in Ukraine by the "Democratic Initiatives Foundation" Analytical Center in June, 2006. Its publication was supported by the National Endowment for Democracy and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation.

*Ukraine's Place in NATO: Expert Survey Results* is a 252 page publication divided into six parts. The first is an introduction of the NATO expert opinion survey from DIF Director Ilko Kucheriv. This is followed by a summary of the sixty-nine sets of responses gathered from a field of domestic and international experts. A full list of the experts is provided as well.

The publication also includes two transcripts from two gatherings of NATO experts: "Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic Choice" (Kyiv, November 2005) and "Ukraine's place in NATO" (Kyiv, October 2005).

The English language excerpts cover the first three sections of the original Ukrainian language publication: *Introduction, Main Conclusions and List of Experts*. The original Ukrainian language is available for download on the dif.org.ua and exitpoll.org.ua websites:

<http://www.dif.org.ua/publics/doc.php?action=nato/nato>

<http://exitpoll.org.ua/?idt=287&langid=1>

The DIF Project Director was Ilko Kucheriv. The project team consisted of: Hryhoriy Perepelytsya, Olena Zlobina, Olha Maksymenko, Oksana Furdyha, Mariya Didenko, Oleksandr Dyshlevyy, Iryna Filipchuk, and Mark Rachkevych.

***English language translation & editing for clarity and style contributed by the Center for US-Ukrainian Relations.***

## Introduction

Ukraine should become a member of NATO. This entirely serves the country's national interests. Accession to NATO will allow the country to finally become a full-fledged member of the family of European nations, will contribute to its social and economic development, and guarantee stability in Europe. This opinion is shared by all of the experts who took part in the survey. The expert opinion survey was organized by the *Democratic Initiatives Foundation* within the framework of the *Ukraine's Place in NATO* project.

In late 2005, 69 experts specializing in internal and foreign affairs, security, and communications were polled. The project's goal was (and remains so) to contribute arguments to the public discussion as to what is best for protecting and developing Ukraine's national interests. The results of traditional public opinion surveys provided startling indicators that showed the population is largely uninformed about the country's foreign policy priorities that acted as a catalyst for initiating the accession process. Average citizens know very little about organizations like the WTO, EU, NATO and CES. They know even less about how joining (or not joining) any these organizations could influence their lives.

In today's Ukraine, state authorities rarely speak with the people: they do not publicize their achievements or speak of the state's national interests. The epoch of "temnyky" (secret media instructions developed by the presidential administration) is over. However, a period of "yasnyky" ("clarity") has yet to emerge in the way that it has in countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community, where government officials hold purposeful discussions with citizens, while accounting for their actions.

Public opinion poll results commissioned by DIF in November of 2005 found that the public was largely uninformed about NATO. A mere 1% of respondents correctly answered the question "How many wars has NATO started?" (The correct answer is: one). When asked: "Did NATO initiate the current military operation in Iraq?", 88% of respondents either answered incorrectly or did not know; only 12% gave the correct answer.

With public opinion showing an absence of accurate public information about NATO, experts in the various fields of NATO were asked why this might be so. They were also asked about their ideas for improving the way the Euro-Atlantic ambitions are communicated in the country. The sixty-nine respondents were asked the following questions:

- 1. In your opinion is NATO membership consistent with Ukraine's national interests and is that membership worth pursuing in the immediate future?**
- 2. What are five advantages/benefits to Ukraine's NATO membership? Please explain.**
- 3. What awaits Ukraine if the country does not join NATO?**
- 4. Opponents of Ukraine's accession use three basic arguments in their anti-NATO rhetoric: a) NATO is an aggressive military bloc that provokes conflicts, b) Ukraine's NATO membership will cost too much and the country cannot afford it, and c) NATO membership for Ukraine will ruin relations with Russia. What kind of counterarguments can be made, in your opinion?**

## **5. In your opinion, what should be included in an information campaign on Ukraine's NATO membership?**

The results of the survey found that expert and public opinion Ukraine's NATO membership are drastically different.

Experts do not question the necessity of joining NATO. They approach the issue from the standpoint of looking for the most optimal ways of joining the Alliance. They analyze the consequences of joining NATO and consider Ukraine's future role in the alliance.

Matters are more bleak with the public. Support for NATO is not strong; public opinion polls clearly show less support for joining NATO than for joining the European Union. The public is unaware of the benefits they will enjoy as a result of the country's full Euro-Atlantic integration.

Public opinion concerning the Alliance can be changed; the viewpoints are not written in stone. To precipitate change, the country's leaders must have a strong will; a large-scale public awareness campaign needs to be conducted. Ukrainian authorities and the political elite should explain to average citizens how proceeding with NATO accession corresponds to the country's national interests of the country and what benefits it will bring. Most of the new NATO member countries have followed this proven path.

Attaining NATO membership should be one of the motivating factors driving both internal and foreign policies in Ukraine. This will happen only be achieved after society reaches a broad consensus concerning such an important choice.

Shortly after the survey started, one expert suggested the inclusion of an addition question, namely "**What awaits Ukraine if the country does not join NATO?**" The responses received were unanimous: failure to join NATO will carry catastrophic consequences. Six scenarios are discussed. Ukraine runs the risk of failing as a state, indeed becoming an economically-stagnant third rate "buffer zone" country – even to the point of ceasing to exist as a sovereign state and being broken up into several territories.

Our survey confirmed the widely recognized tenet that an awareness campaign is an essential component of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Dialogue with the public and organizations of civil society provide the campaign's backbone. Changes must occur within society first, and they must be the results of internal civic efforts.

On most levels, European and Euro-Atlantic integration are synonymous. At stake is the application of a model already tested by developed countries: the establishment of a democracy that provides normal living, social, business, and security and defense conditions. As Ukraine increasingly approaches the standards shared by NATO member countries, priority must always be given to the individual over the state.

*Ilko Kucheriv, director, Democratic Initiatives Foundation*

## Main Conclusions

### 1. Do you feel that NATO membership is in line with Ukraine's national interests and that membership is worth pursuing in the immediate future?

Regarding whether NATO accession corresponds to Ukraine's national interests, the experts tended to provide positive opinions, stressing the following points:

1. Currently, there are no direct military threats to Ukraine's security. However, this does not mean that such threats will not arise in the future.
2. In its current state of insufficient funding, the Ukrainian military cannot alone ensure an adequate level of security for the country.
3. Ukrainian society must consciously realize the limitations of the state in ensuring military security. Thus, society must understand the importance of making a choice in favor of either joining the alliance or another system of international security.
4. The status of membership in a system of collective security for Ukraine is more acceptable than the status of neutrality or being a non-aligned country.
5. There are two possible paths to ensure collective security for Ukraine: the Eurasian Tashkent Agreement and the Euro-Atlantic NATO.
6. NATO membership signifies Ukraine's support of the values of European civilization, inasmuch as the NATO model best corresponds to Ukraine's interests in ensuring democracy and human rights. These are recognized as fundamental principles of NATO's existence.
7. No international organization can provide greater guarantees of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity for Ukraine other than the North Atlantic alliance, inasmuch as NATO currently contributes most to international security in the region and the globe. Even the European Union is dependent on the military-political framework provided by NATO. Thus, even Ukraine's quest to join the EU leaves a number of issues of a military-political nature unresolved.

Some experts cautioned against viewing the "membership" tag as a panacea and stressed the importance of the steps the country needs to take to fully meet the criteria of NATO membership both in letter and in spirit. They called for a sober evaluation of the state's capabilities and more focus on the transitional stages the country must complete prior to joining the alliance.

Concerning timeframes for NATO accession, expert opinion was split. One group expressed support for joining NATO as quickly as possible; the earliest date mentioned falling in the first months of 2008.

The second group questioned quick NATO accession in the near future arguing that Ukraine is objectively economically, politically and militarily unprepared. They also pointed to the absence of public consensus supporting NATO membership at this stage of the accession process.

## **2. What are five advantages/benefits to Ukraine's NATO membership? Please explain.**

The surveyed experts agreed that Ukraine's accession to NATO will:

- have a positive impact on European security and strengthen stability and security in the Black Sea region, Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus;
- stimulate the consolidation of the Christian world and contribute to the convergence of Christian value systems from both the Eastern (Orthodox) and Western traditions. This undoubtedly is essential for stability on the continent.

The benefits and advantages experts believed Ukrainian will enjoy as a NATO member can be divided into two general groups: a) the advantages and achievements experienced during the various stages of the accession process, and b) the advantages that directly arise from full-fledged membership.

### ***Pre-membership Advantages gained from the various stages of the accession process:***

1. Ukraine's leaders have realized that the country must choose a certain and specific security model (between the Tashkent Pact, neutrality, or NATO) because "playing on several many fields at the same time is dangerous."
2. The NATO accession process has introduced higher and better standards for the country's political, economic and military spheres:
  - The Alliance has specific requirements concerning democratic values, respect for human rights and civic freedoms. Striving to adhere to these criteria is an impetus to continue and strengthen the democratic transformation occurring in Ukraine.
  - The Alliance requires its member countries to be economically "healthy" and thus devotes attention to economic transformations in applicant countries. A condition of accession is the development of market transformations, e.g. the necessity of establishing a minimal hourly wages, etc.
  - Adhering to accession criteria entails reforms to both the defense and military-political spheres, particularly, the definitive institutionalization of civilian control over the military.
3. In countries where political standards and the standards of living are not as high as in the West, the mere introduction (or imitation) of NATO indicators, institutions and norms produces positive results. These norms have resulted in the breaking of old stereotypes and formation of new beneficial habits.

### ***Direct Advantages of Membership***

#### *External*

NATO membership will truly provide Ukraine an opportunity to solidify its sovereignty. Specifically:

1. Having joined NATO, Ukraine will have graduated to the "a higher league" of world politics, enjoying the position of a country that independently chooses its external political course.
2. Ukraine will increasingly play a greater role in international efforts, such as the anti-terrorist coalition, regular participation in NATO and UN peacekeeping operations, etc.
3. Ukraine will not only be a participant in peacekeeping operations, but will also be involved in formulating the alliance's political decisions and international policies in the region.



4. Ukraine's membership in NATO will place the country in a position to influence the possible future transformation of NATO.
5. Ukraine's quest to join NATO is a catalyst of the general process of Europeanization occurring in the country. Membership will solidify the country's sense of belonging to Europe. Living among European countries with the baggage of the Soviet past is impossible, as one analyst put it.
6. Membership in NATO, in the opinion of most experts, will be an important step on the path to full European integration. It will:
  - provide more opportunities for cooperation with member countries;
  - facilitate Ukraine's entry into other international organizations such as the WTO and EU. (Some experts did point out that the processes of joining NATO, EU, and WTO are sufficiently different to be considered unrelated.)
7. Ukraine will obtain unprecedented guarantees for the protection of its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. Specifically, Article 5 of the Washington Agreement provides guarantees for regulating all contentious issues even at the stage of the country's preparation to join NATO.
8. Joining NATO will allow Ukraine the opportunity to enlist additional support for resolving so called "frozen conflicts" on the country's borders, including the Black Sea and Trans-Dniester, the latter being the most dangerous potential powder keg.
9. NATO membership will be Ukraine's answer to the geopolitical aspirations of Russia. In particular, Ukraine will:
  - actually leave the Russian sphere of geopolitical influence and will be able to build normal relations with Russia on an equal footing (having come from under Russian domination);
  - decrease its dependence on Russia in strategic military matters;
  - be more resistant to interference by Russia in the country's internal matters.

### *Internal*

In their responses, the surveyed experts divided the internal benefits of NATO membership into three general categories: security, economy and democracy (politics).

### *Security Issues*

1. Ukraine will be in a stable, collective system of security. This will provide opportunities for strengthening those elements of security, which cannot be strengthened relying solely on the country's own efforts;
2. Adhering to new standards of defense, security, equipment, and know-how;
3. Military reforms are heading towards creating a professional army that will enjoy higher European cultural standards of military life;
4. Increased capacity for overcoming natural and man-made catastrophes, environmental threats;
5. Increased capacity due to coordination in the war on terrorism.

### *Economic advantages*

1. Rationalization of defense spending and dependable security guarantees will be achieved as a condition of membership. NATO guarantees the security and stability of its members even as defense budgets are reduced: in the last 10 years European countries have reduced their military budgets by 16%, making them on average less than 2% of GNP. The procurement of military equipment by European member-states has dropped by 18% since 1999.

2. NATO membership provides economic security and Ukraine will be considered for its economy and investment opportunities. The economic benefits of NATO membership were experienced in the following countries during the first and second waves of NATO eastward expansion:
  - *Poland* - In 1997 FDI was US \$2.7 billion, by 1999 (the year of NATO accession) FDI stood at US \$8 billion (more than US \$5 billion in two years);
  - *Czech Republic* - In 1997 FDI was US \$4 billion, in 1999 (the year of NATO accession) FDI stood at US \$12.8 billion (more than \$8 billion in two years);
  - *Hungary* - In 1998, FDI was US \$10.2 billion, in 1999 (the year of NATO accession) FDI stood at US \$ 14.5 billion;
  - *Romania* - The year it entered NATO (2004), the volume of foreign direct investment in Romania grew by 141% yoy.
3. Development of the Military Industrial Complex
  - Military standards for equipment will comply to general NATO standards, which will enable the opening of new markets (e.g. transport aviation); membership may lead to an increase in the number of purchase orders received by the domestic defense industry;
  - Ukraine's military industrial complex will become less dependent on the Russian military industrial complex;
4. Growth of scientific and research potential: participation in the various educational and scientific NATO programs;
5. Required support programs for military personnel will help them make the transition back to civilian communities.

#### *Advantages for Ukrainian democracy*

1. Membership will politically elevate Ukraine, there will be increased sense of national pride in belonging to a family of leading nations. Membership will solidify a maturing national identity and should help eliminate the "inferiority complex" prevalent (at times imposed) in Ukrainian society;
2. The democratic transformations in Ukraine are irreversible. Having joined NATO, Ukraine will have no choice but to adhere to high NATO standards of political and socio-economic development;
3. Obvious contribution to civil society;
4. The acceptance of new social standards that require a shift in public perception: the state is not the priority, the people are;
5. Improved delivery of government services and protection of human and social rights, freedoms and equalities come with NATO membership. Joining the alliance requires an independent judiciary and democratic policy making and execution by all branches of government on all of its levels (from national to local);
6. The membership debate should promote a better internal political culture, relations and dialogue between the country's various centers of power.\*

---

\* This point was made months prior to the Feodosiya fiasco in Crimea in June of 2006 - *ed.*

### 3. What awaits Ukraine if the country does not join NATO?

Experts noted that whatever Ukraine's choice, the country will be located on the "front" of NATO's eastward expansion. The country can be on either side of that front as member, neighbor or the first line of defense. It lies on a geopolitical fault line. The benefits Ukraine's unique geopolitical position were supposed to have provided were grossly overstated. After decades of economic stagnation, Ukraine gradually found itself on the periphery of global processes. Investments, new energy routes and advancements in technology largely by-passed Ukraine. An undefined foreign policy ultimately had an impact on the internal socio-economic situation. According to current human development indicators, Ukraine finds itself at an alarming cusp: the country is ranked 67th of 102 in terms of economic development. Ukraine ranked 43rd on a recent public welfare scale.

The rapprochement between Washington and Moscow after the events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the fragility of Ukraine's efforts to play off the various sides in the USA–EU–Russia triangle. The world now expects Ukraine to act clearly and determinedly concerning its strategic direction. Experts noted that Ukraine will enjoy greater economic benefits and security guarantees if it joins NATO as opposed to becoming the westernmost brick in a new Eastern Bloc wall.

All but two of the experts in the survey said the country will face **negative consequences if it fails to join NATO\***.

Experts considered the impact that non-accession will have on the country in the context of *current geopolitical processes*. Specifically:

- the negative consequences of failing to join NATO may be mitigated if genuine democratic transformations occur in Russia. A democratic Russia would drastically change the current security arrangements on the Eurasian continent, from Atlantic to Pacific. A democratic and cooperative Russia would lead to a leveling off of differences between members and nonmembers of NATO. In the democratic Russia scenario, the question of accession loses its sense of urgency for Ukraine;
- Ukraine's non-accession can deal a serious blow to NATO's expansion strategy and can negatively influence relations within the Euro-Atlantic community, by continuing the trend of "politico-strategic convergence" in the "West".

#### Six Scenarios

In the survey, experts explored six possible scenarios for Ukraine if the country does not become a full-fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community:

*Scenario One* – Ukraine becomes mired in a position of constant indecision. The negative consequences of such a development are:

- Ukraine will become a **grey buffer zone** – a territory that is outside of common security policies. At the very least, the country will be further marginalized from international security processes;

---

\* Only two of 69 experts said that NATO membership will have negative consequences for Ukraine arguing:

- Ukraine currently is not a member of NATO, yet that does not prevent the country from maintaining high level relations with the Alliance;
- Ukraine's de facto non-aligned status suits both Russia and NATO;
- If Ukraine does not join NATO in the immediate future that does not preclude joining the alliance at some later date.

- Ukraine will be left in a zone of indecisiveness between East and West, in a security vacuum, and will thus be more susceptible to foreign pressure;
- Ukraine will become isolated and will not be respected as an equal partner on the international arena.

*Scenario Two* - Ukraine remains a **neutral state**. The chances of this scenario of succeeding are unlikely because of Ukraine's geopolitical location and from the point of view of current trends and developments in international relations. At one time, the principle of neutrality, remaining non-aligned and a "multi-vector" foreign policy played a positive role in strengthening national state sovereignty. However, those nation-building processes were protracted in time, experts noted. By devoting time and energy on constantly shifting "position" in relation to the Russia – EU – USA triangle, Ukraine's domestic development suffered as a result.

The negative consequences of neutrality include:

- the state will need to significantly increase defense spending to be able to guarantee state security, sovereignty, and independence;
- the country will fall behind European countries and Russia technologically, institutionally, and psychologically.

*Scenario Three* suggests possible steps that could be taken to avoid the dangers described in the two previous scenarios. It is a "**pseudo-non-accession**" variant. It would be based upon a unique international cooperation arrangement with certain guarantees for Ukraine. For example, Ukraine would be a formally non-aligned country whose status is guaranteed by agreements between NATO and/or European countries with the Tashkent bloc and/or countries under Russian influence. Experts noted that this variant will only work while the human development disparities between Russia and NATO remain large.

*Scenario Four* – Ukraine will continue falling **under Russian influence** and sooner or later will be reincorporated into a **new Eastern bloc**. The negative consequences of this variant are:

- Ukraine will lose the ability to lobby its own interests in Europe and the USA;
- A long term threat to European stability will emerge in the institutionalization of a new cold war. This will also lead to additional spending and losses - not all of which are measurable from purely a financial point of view.

Experts warned of possible negative consequences for Ukraine on the part of Russia if Ukraine is constantly wavering on the "to join or not to join" questions (can be called the **Hamlet scenario**). Ukraine's perpetual indecision will encourage Russia to:

- continue exerting political pressure and using economic blackmail until such time that a Moscow-centered Russian Empire is renewed in one form or another;
- exert greater control over Ukrainian foreign and domestic policies, which will be an obvious loss of sovereignty;
- continue pursuing policies to "protect Russian national interests" in Ukraine (e.g.: Crimea, Black Sea Fleet, Tuzla and others).

*Scenario Five* – Ukraine will continue declaring NATO membership as a strategic goal, but will do little to move beyond the **status quo**. This is the current situation that is characterized by lagging reforms, internal conflict over the accession issue, Russian interference and Western aversion to involvement. The negative consequences of maintaining relations at the current level:

- Ukraine's prospects for full European integration will be postponed for decades;
- Ukraine will remain on the periphery of integration processes; the country's dependence on partners will grow, but the potential for partnerships will diminish;

- Ukraine's ability to ensure its territorial integrity and sovereignty will be doubted and potentially challenged.

*The Sixth Scenario* – the disintegration of Ukraine into a number of territories (referred to as the **Yugoslavia scenario**). The country is broken down into various 21<sup>st</sup> century feudal spheres of influence as a result of successfully engineered crises that exploit ethno-religious differences, federalism and regional rights, language, etc.

### **Threats and losses**

The negative consequences of Ukraine's failure to join NATO, in the opinion of experts, can be divided into the following general groups:

#### ***Future threats***

The most dangerous threat according to experts is the **loss of statehood**. Systematic external and internal campaigns of destabilization can undermine Ukraine's ability to function as a state and ensure its territorial integrity. In the event of loss of statehood:

- the Ukrainian state's external and internal policies will be navigated by Moscow, which will lead to the complete loss of state sovereignty and independence for the country;
- political polarization will occur in the country: the Western part and right bank of Ukraine, together with Kyiv, will continue striving towards Europe, while left bank Ukraine, composed of the country's Eastern and Southern parts, will gravitate towards Moscow, (resulting the country's possible dissolution);
- these threats will be accompanied by efforts to undermine the civic authority of government and to decrease public support for Ukrainian statehood in general.

#### ***Lost opportunities***

Experts agreed that the greatest loss will be that of time. Potentially, all the achievements of the past few years will be lost. A list of losses that would be incurred should Ukraine fail to join NATO includes:

- the opportunity to make a clear European choice and rise up out of a geopolitical quagmire, one in which the country has been wallowing for hundreds of years;
- the opportunity to create new mechanisms and pursue opportunities for quicker integration into the general European community, including efforts to join the European Union, the WTO and other international structures;
- the chance to become an independent political player and influence decisions made regarding European issues;
- the chance to improve the standard of living in the country;
- the chance to strengthen the development of civil society.

#### ***External political losses***

Experts note that non-accession to NATO will negatively influence Ukraine's image on the international arena, and the country's international prestige will plummet.

Expected negative consequences include:

6. Western partners will harbor serious doubts regarding Ukraine's foreign policy and the consistency of internal reforms;
7. Western partners will no longer trust that Ukraine is a country that genuinely wants to belong to the European community of nations;

8. Ukraine's entry into other international organizations, particularly the EU, will be impeded;
9. Ukraine faces the prospect of being known as a “good neighbor behind a closed door” in perpetuity.

### ***Internal political losses***

Experts stated that the general negative outcome of non-accession will be a slow down in implementing economic, political and social reforms. Further democratic transformations will be delayed and internal democratization processes will come to a halt. Authoritarian tendencies will be strengthened within the country.

Non-accession will lead to economic and political instability:

#### *In the economic and defense spheres*

- the investment climate will worsen, the dangers of an influx of adventurous, risky capital with short term intentions of gaining quick benefits will be prevalent;
- defense sector reforms will come to a halt;
- 2. opportunities for improving the competitiveness of the country's military industry will be lost resulting in economic lag;
- 3. roadblocks will prevent the technical development of Ukraine's military industrial complex and participation in European and Euro-Atlantic projects;
- 4. defense budget expenditures will rise resulting in a waste of valuable state budgetary resources that could otherwise be earmarked to resolve pressing socio-economic challenges.

#### *In the socio-political sphere*

- the slow down of democratic institutional reform;
- the demise of those democratic forces who supported Euro-Atlantic integration;
- the restoration of different forms of authoritarianism within the country;
- the increase of societal and political tensions as the pro-western strata of Ukrainian society experience the shock of non-accession;
- the growth of social and political pessimism.

#### **4. Opponents of Ukraine's NATO membership share three basic biased views about NATO:**

*1. NATO is an aggressive military bloc that provokes conflict. What kind of arguments can refute this statement?*

Most experts felt that the characterization of NATO as an “aggressive military bloc” was something largely contrived. Logically, one would employ objective counter arguments\* to refute such claims.

However, an analysis of the discussion between those for and those against NATO membership begins with recognizing the difference between artificial and objective arguments. Normally, objective arguments arise during the process of examining serious issues and problems. Artificial or “false” arguments lie in the domain of political battles. Clearly, rational arguments are necessary to refute objective arguments. Yet, counterarguments prove useless against artificial (false) arguments. Indeed, they are often harmful for they manifest the absence of real substance with the opposition position and the resulting collisions suggest problems will continue.

#### **False prejudice**

A majority of experts agreed that the contrived prejudices (false arguments) about NATO aggression are based upon stereotypes formed during the Cold War and are a reflection of the Soviet doctrine “NATO is a threat to world peace.” (In response to the assertion that NATO provokes conflict experts made some of the following statements: out-of-date, a myth of Soviet times, experiences of the past, post-Soviet inertia of thinking, recidivism that reaches back to the Stalin period, a communist propagandist ploy, tales of the Cold War). This stereotype or false argument was not based on rational arguments. It was asserted to support the basis for the Warsaw Pact (our friends) members' opposition to NATO (our enemy). This stereotype is used to obfuscate the true nature of NATO. For example, the term “defense” is substituted with “aggression” and the slogan “provocateur of conflict” is used in place of the slogan “peacekeeping activity.”

Experts also drew attention to the fact that this stereotype is actively supported and fermented by anti-Western and anti-NATO political forces and parties in Ukraine. They cited the anti-NATO propaganda during Kuchma's presidency and pre-election campaigns as examples. They also pointed to circles within Russia that still view NATO as a threat to their security interests, as the source of the stereotype.

A few experts underestimated the influential power of this negative stereotype, and are convinced that it “will not hold against any criticism, if the issue is examined in detail.” As one expert noted, “Honestly speaking, I cannot understand those people who live with these stereotypes in the present day – these are simpletons living in the dinosaur age.” Indeed, some experts felt it is unnecessary to provide counterarguments, in as much as the supporters of the “aggressive agenda” stereotype are unable to provide a single supporting argument.

Ultimately, rational arguments that would dispel the falsehoods will do little to sway those who harbor Cold War stereotypes (particularly among the elderly). “If these [stereotypes] were true, then Europe would look very different than it does today,” one expert noted. Nevertheless, many

---

\* One expert suggested that the stereotypes are not merely prejudices, but are widely held as beliefs; he noted that even as beliefs, anti-NATO sentiments can be dealt with by better communicating the primary benefit of NATO membership as a step further into Europe.

among the elderly remain stubbornly closed-minded, inasmuch as they see Europe through a prism created during the Cold War.

Another group of experts said the "aggressive agenda" stereotype has taken deep root and that change will only come about with changes in generations.

Some experts argued that waiting for a generation shift would be a mistake and that the imperative is to find ways of breaking this stereotype. They suggest employing various informational strategies aimed at different groups (separate regions and age groups). The main thrust of their strategy involves creating "a new myth and forming a positive image of NATO." Some experts suggested using the "know-how" new NATO member countries used to deal with anti-NATO groups during their accession processes.

An important message is contained in the facts of cooperation between NATO and Russia. The level of cooperation is significantly higher than the current level between NATO and Ukraine. Another method compares NATO and Warsaw Pact aggression. Such an argument supports the fact that NATO never used force against its allies unlike the Warsaw Pact (for example, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and almost Poland). NATO never executed (secret) "backroom decisions" like the Soviet Union did when it invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979. Moreover, since NATO's creation, not a single country has left the alliance; membership only expanded (from twelve countries in 1949 to twenty-six today). These arguments can be used to form a positive image of NATO.

*Rational counterarguments* to refute statements about NATO aggression are based on the following theses:

*NATO history and purpose:*

1. NATO aggression is not supported by any objective facts tied to the activities of the alliance (i.e., concrete conflicts; aggressive occupation of a country initiated by NATO).
2. From its inception, NATO's purpose was to prevent aggression, by means of a **collective defense**. NATO prevented armed conflict between Greece and Turkey.
3. NATO has never committed an act of aggression since its creation. The organization participates in **peacekeeping missions** and as an intermediary. NATO presence in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq had the requisite UN resolutions on regulating conflict in these countries.
4. NATO has a long history and has proven its ability to ensure peace in the world, foremost in Europe.
5. NATO is not an aggressive bloc. Indeed, it is not a bloc at all – NATO is an internationally respected military-political organization that carefully formulates and realizes its strategy.

*Contemporary transformation of NATO*

1. In the late 1990s, NATO transformed itself from a military-political organization into a political-military union. NATO has evolved into an international, political organization with a military disposition, which has in essence become diminutive, and whose military might does not pose a threat to any other countries.
2. Civilian politicians hold leading roles in NATO. In particular, the General Secretary is a civilian who executes his authority through appropriate civilian and military organs. He carries out the Alliance's leadership activities. The highest governing body of the alliance is the North Atlantic Council of NATO that has real political



power and authority regarding *the ratification of decisions*. Note that the decisions are made exclusively in the capitals of member-participants by the highest leadership of each country. The military committee, which carries out the general leadership of military activities, is accountable to the NATO Council.

3. In as much as a communist threat no longer exists, the defense budgets of NATO constituent members have been reduced by 25%. NATO was the initiator of the REAP program for 46 countries. Former Warsaw Pact members have cooperated with NATO and participated in the "Partnership for Peace" program. NATO works closely with the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the UN.
4. Today, NATO is an alliance involved in more than military security. Given all the military structures, NATO is the most effective organization for dealing with the various manifestations of terrorism prevalent in the world today.
5. NATO's own policy documents show a new emphasis on "soft security issues" instead of the traditional "hard security matters." These issues include non-military threats such as combating drug trafficking; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the illegal arms trade and illegal migration.

#### *Principles of activity*

1. NATO is currently composed of 26 countries. Decisions of the North Atlantic Council are made via consensus with the meetings chaired by the General Secretary. The most important strategic decisions must either be ratified or rejected by the democratically-elected parliaments of the member-countries. The chances of NATO aggression are about as good as the chances of all EU member countries agreeing on a constitution, for example.
2. Individual member countries are not aggressive. Ukraine enjoys very good relations with each of the member countries of the alliance. These are countries where Ukrainians vacation, study and work. To suggest that when combined they form an aggressive military block is absurd.
3. To assert that the 26 countries are aggressive when taken together is to say the EU is an aggressive entity because it is comprised of mostly NATO countries. To put it differently, if Ukrainians truly aspire to enter the EU, then their goal is to become an aggressive country.
4. Perceived NATO aggression is primarily tied to US policy. It is worth noting that the policy of the White House in the international arena is not always identical to those of its allies or NATO, which summons real contradictions. Hence one must separate the USA (as a sovereign country) from NATO (e.g.: Kyoto Protocol).
5. When military decisions are made, each member of the alliance has the right to state its case to all other members. NATO necessitates direct action when there is a direct attack on one of the members of the organization. Other decisions of NATO are not obligatory for members. Each member of NATO individually determines its own contribution in any activity, even when those activities involve the use of military force.

A separate set of arguments can be put forward concerning *NATO's participation in conflicts* in recent years, in particular, in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

1. NATO peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq were not provoked by the organization itself. As a rule, NATO becomes involved in conflicts, which are tied to the participants of different sides, and plays a stabilizing role.
2. NATO's involvement in Kosovo in 1999 was reasonable, inasmuch as the UN and the OSCE failed to settle the Kosovo conflict and restore order in the region.

3. Today nearly all countries of the former Yugoslavia have either fully acceded to NATO, like Slovenia, or are in the process of doing so. These countries do not blame NATO for what happened in FYR in 1999. Accountability for starting the conflict is placed for the most part on the Milosevic regime and those involved in ethnic cleansing. Despite a feeling that Yugoslavia became a victim of NATO, those countries that formed the basis of the former Yugoslavia are seeking NATO membership. Yet, Ukraine still remains beyond the boundaries of the Alliance.
4. Currently, NATO's only joint-military operation is in Afghanistan. There is no basis for labeling this operation as aggressive since it is similar to many peacekeeping missions, in which Ukraine is participating. Moreover, operations being conducted in Afghanistan are taking place with the participation of the European Union – no one has called this an aggressive bloc.
5. Multinational financial assistance for renewing normal living conditions and democratic institutions in society are at the forefront of NATO activities. Not a single territory or country ever submitted to occupation or annexation in these missions. War criminals responsible for conflict have faced justice before national and international tribunals.

Experts also highlighted a series of potential reservations regarding NATO membership that could affect Ukraine's membership in NATO:

1. Ukraine's membership and that of several other recent members (Poland, the Czech Republic, etc.), will not significantly impact the formulation and realization of the alliance's strategy. These countries will become automatically subjected to the general policies of the Alliance. Yet, NATO's interests will not always coincide with those interests of Ukraine. This is best captured in the sentiment: "NATO is expanding its operations in Afghanistan, I think, that for us, there is nothing to do in Afghanistan."
2. Ukraine's relations with the USA will not allow Ukraine to say "no" to military operations, as France, Germany and Norway can. Having become a member of NATO, it will be very difficult for Ukraine to play by its own rules.

#### **4. Opponents of Ukraine's NATO membership share three basic biased views about NATO:**

- 2. Ukraine's accession to NATO will cost a great deal and the state can not afford the transition*

In the survey, experts examined the costs of joining NATO both in general and in more detailed terms.

##### *General conditions*

1. There is a relationship between the cost expressed in monetary units and the political price, (also expressed as the strategic price or moments of security). As such, the exact relationship has to be determined – if we are interested in something, then we must pay for it; if we begrudge the money, then we are not sufficiently interested.
2. NATO membership will cost the state, but the price of not joining NATO will cost a great deal more (See the answers to question number three in the survey for a detailed discussion of the cost of "non-membership" for Ukraine). The principle of collective defense is always less expensive than the principle of individual defense. A collective system of security is a security network for which no single state could possibly incur all the costs.
3. Accession to NATO, of course, will cost some money. But spending will be more cost-effective from the point of view of guaranteeing Ukrainian security.
4. Accession to NATO is generally within the range of the military budget. Reforming the military has to be undertaken inevitably, regardless of NATO membership. Reforms always carry a price. NATO could help Ukraine with these reforms. It is now possible to implement various financing programs, and NATO provides assistance for military reform. In this way it will even be more cost effective.
5. NATO does require military spending from members; the only precondition is to spend up to 2% of GDP (France – 2.7%, Germany – 1.5%, Spain – 1.3%, Poland – 2.0%). Ukrainian legislation foresees spending no less than 3% of GDP on defense. The cost-benefit ratios of NATO's organizational functions are not higher than 0.5% of the general defense spending of each country.
6. Country-member accounts are settled based on the gross national product per capita in proportion to the capability of the state.
7. Modernization always costs something however, not a single country has gone bankrupt after joining NATO. Countries considerably poorer than Ukraine, in particular Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia have successfully joined NATO without experiencing any budgetary catastrophes or adverse effects to their national economies.
8. Special investment funds were created to assist new country-members that face economic challenges or are in a state of market development. For example, during the period of 1999 – 2005 the Czech Republic received close to 130.4 million dollars from the military budget of NATO to improve its military installations and infrastructure of its country. The total cost was initially planned to be 190 million.
9. NATO does not require new members to spend money on rearmament. The main costs are in the spheres of communications, management and cooperative systems between armed forces. Examples of Poland and Hungary and showed that the armaments, which they inherited from the Warsaw Pact, were in principle sufficient to meet NATO requirements.

10. The experience of new member countries shows that defense spending has not essentially changed (as a percentage GDP). At the same time, most of these countries have decreased the size of their military, ensured normal standards of social security for their military personnel, and improved their military readiness.
11. Economic and financial dividends from NATO membership will outweigh the expenses a state must spend toward joining NATO.
12. Accession guarantees, first of all, transparent procedures on the use of funds. Secondly, public protection over budget line items and the expenditures of these monies will remain. Finally, civilian control over the spending of these monies guarantees their safekeeping and effective use.
13. Ukraine can interest NATO in the manufacturing of contemporary armaments. Ukraine has a large pool of well experienced engineers, builders, and affordable manpower, not to mention a tradition of manufacturing armaments.

Experts stressed the necessity to publicize how military spending is calculated, including an analysis of current real incomes versus possible incomes related to membership. In particular they named:

*Concrete gains*

1. NATO will provide technical assistance to Ukraine at its own expense.
2. Military and industrial cooperation with Alliance countries that possess high technologies will improve.

*Concrete costs*

1. Direct costs regarding membership in NATO, (organizational expenses and financing employee personnel within the NATO structure; contributions to the organization's budget; and also the support of the country in joint military operations.)
2. Direct costs for the modernization of the army and the military industrial complex.
3. Indirect costs, which Ukraine will incur as a result of downsizing its military industrial complex.
4. The cost of changing the technology for manufacturing within its military industrial complex.
5. As a member of NATO Ukraine will have to adhere to all adjustments the Alliance requires regarding the trade in arms and on export control and therefore, may lose certain arms trading markets.

#### **4. Opponents of Ukraine's NATO membership share three basic biased views about NATO:**

##### *3. NATO accession will ruin Ukraine's relationship with Russia.*

Experts strongly emphasized this issue because of its resonance with the population of Ukraine. Polls indicate that the public to a large extent is against NATO membership for fear of worsening the relationship with Russia.

An analysis of expert counterarguments provides a dynamic series of viewpoints.

*Ukraine's accession to NATO cannot spoil relations with Russia because membership does not pose a threat, and will even be beneficial for bilateral relations.*

1. Accession to NATO has never ruined relationships for any member. Countries that joined NATO became even more friendly, because they became allies, and they hold the same values;
2. Russia, for its part, is actively cooperating with NATO and is not viewed as its military foe. NATO has no combative plans against Russia. On the contrary, NATO is developing close cooperation with Russia to strengthen general European security. Ukraine's accession to NATO therefore, cannot interfere with Russia's interests;
3. Russia's best friends in Europe are France and Germany. Both are members of NATO;
4. Member-countries of the Alliance are interested in maintaining good neighborly partner relations with the Russian Federation, as well as in progressively bringing it closer with the EU and NATO. Having a stable good neighbor partner relationship with the Russian Federation for Ukraine will give it additional support from country-members of the Alliance for its accession to NATO;
5. Relations between Russia and the member-countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Hungary) have not deteriorated. Clearly, membership in NATO should not translate as worsening relations with Ukraine;
6. Considering a democratic Russia's national interests in the widest sense, it is undoubtedly important for Russia to have a stable democracy on its western border. This does not pose a threat to Russia itself;
7. Ukraine's accession to NATO will benefit Russia because the North Atlantic Alliance will be on its border, making it easier to further develop a relationship. If Ukraine becomes a member of the Alliance, then it will be the first country that will stimulate relationship-building activities between the Alliance and Russia. This would lead to Ukraine never ratifying a decision that contradicts Russia's national interests.
8. Russia is Ukraine's main strategic partner, and the countries are tied by families. Having joined NATO, Ukraine would not want to see any problems with such an influential country on a global scale, such as Russia.
9. While building its relationship with the Alliance, Ukraine has taken an approach that includes its obligations to its strategic partner – Russia. Ukraine is not ready to back away from obligations that ensure peaceful developments between two neighboring countries.

*Relations could exceptionally deteriorate because of Russia's own position*

1. Ukraine's relations with Russia cannot be damaged by Russia alone;
2. Russia's current political elite is certainly against Ukraine's membership in NATO, in the same way that it was against the accession of the Baltic countries to NATO. Despite public pronouncements of neutrality and recognition of sovereignty and the right of every country to join alliances, Russia consistently promises a review our countries' relations;
3. Imperial Russia will always be unhappy with Ukraine because it is unhappy about the fact that an independent, sovereign Ukraine exists;
4. Ukraine's NATO membership somewhat dampens relations with Russia in the short-term. Initially, there will be a painful reaction, but not because of Ukraine's NATO membership nor because of a NATO threat to Russia. Instead, Russia will react because Ukraine's NATO membership will definitely confirm the fact that Ukraine is out from under Russia's authority, out from under its control;
5. Relations will deteriorate because Russia will use any method in order to impede the Ukraine's accession process. It will influence the situation through direct ties to NATO countries, and NATO leaders. There will be discussion, and Russia will present demands even behind Ukraine's back, and one cannot rule out that Russia will use secret methods.
6. Russia can resort to certain types of pressure, not only politico-psychological, but also economic, such as increasing the price of gas.

*It is impossible to worsen relations because they are already extremely bad*

1. Ukraine's accession to NATO cannot worsen relations with Russia anymore than they are now. Relations today are very tense and nothing else could make them worse. Moreover, NATO accession is not an event that will happen tomorrow considering the internal situation in Ukraine and the current [anti-NATO] mood;
2. A marked reduction in military-technical cooperation with Russia began long before Ukraine announced its course of Euro-Atlantic integration. The reduction is tied to a decrease in the volume of military orders and the transformation of the Russian industrial military complex to a closed domestic cycle of arms production.

*Relations will not grow worse and will become more equal*

1. Russia will respect Ukraine more because it has successfully joined an incredibly powerful international military-political organization;
2. Ukraine will be urged on by the sense of strong support with which Russia will have to reckon. In such a scenario relations will become more pragmatic.

*Relations between Ukraine and Russia will improve*

1. Accession to NATO will improve relations between Ukraine and Russia because both countries will be forced to put their houses in order. The relationship will become more open, and as a result, more orderly;
2. Relations will improve because, on one side, Ukraine will stop fearing for its independence, territorial integrity, and will accept Russia on friendly terms, without fear. Finally, after Ukraine joins NATO, the predominant paradigm in Russia that purports to seek revenge against Ukraine and attempts to restore

the Soviet Union or simply increase the Russian Federation's territory at the Ukraine's expense, will be broken.

*Ukraine should act as a sovereign state, without deferring to Russia*

1. One of Ukraine's greatest foreign policy problems is the constant (re)evaluation of its relations with Russia and the constant desire to satisfy or not anger Russia;
2. Without NATO, Ukraine cannot normalize its relations with Russia. In order to do so would be necessary to completely subordinate our national interests to the policies of a center in Moscow. The political elite of the Russia Federation and a greater part of Russian society perceives an independent Ukraine as a temporary phenomenon (the threat of Russia halting military-technical cooperation with Ukraine in the case that it accedes to NATO; natural gas conflicts, etc.);
3. The new relationship paradigm, which Russia persistently tries to apply in the post-Soviet sphere, is reminiscent of the: "hegemonic country – satellite countries." In this case, satellite country dependency includes political and economic subordination. Any cataclysm in Russia will painfully replicate in the satellite countries; the dynamic development of satellite countries is impossible in the scheme of these kinds of relations;
4. Accession to NATO is the sovereign right of every country, which should be based on following its own national interests;
5. Our prudence is unjustified. We must be extremely active in our plans for NATO membership. Of course, it is worth taking the Russian point of view into account, though it must not hang over us like the "sword of Damocles" and interfere in our joining NATO;
6. Russia declared, and has consistently supported its position that it is not partial to NATO's eastern expansion. This position does not interfere with us having our own position, evidenced by the fact that Ukraine is aspiring to become a member of the Alliance.

*Ukraine should take Russia's interests into account*

1. We, of course, should consider our national interests, but dialog with Russia must continue on the issue of Ukraine's accession to NATO;
2. Ukraine must make arguments that will make allow Russia understand that Ukraine's accession to NATO is not a threat to Russian interests. One has to think about the interests of one's partner and neighbor, otherwise it is impossible to build constructive relations (particularly when speaking about the status of Russian military bases);
3. One must carefully analyze the strategic interests of Russia on our territory, and then determine the parameters of our accession to NATO that would not damage the relationship of the NATO-Russia-Ukraine triangle;
4. It is worthwhile to examine the possibilities of cooperation between Ukraine and Russia in the defense complex. What opportunities exist in this area, what are the risks and expenses? What are the prospects of NATO membership? And here we must make a decision by taking long-term prospects into account.

## **5. In your opinion, what should be included in an information campaign on Ukraine's NATO membership?**

Experts agreed that the current public education campaign concerning NATO has failed to produce satisfactory results. Sociology showed that only 6-7% of the population are sufficiently informed about NATO. The information campaign was centered on developing the messages to be delivered via "strategic public diplomacy." The messaging was to be developed by Ukrainian state organs and select officials from NATO. The public education campaign was institutionalized as the *State program for informing the public about Ukraine's NATO membership*. Experts noted the roles of Ukrainian state structures and NGOs, the NATO Information and Documentation Center in Ukraine and the mass media in the information campaign.

In analyzing the **reasons for an ineffective information campaign**, experts noted the following:

### *Economic reasons*

- There are no state budget funds earmarked for information program implementation (unlike the accession process in other countries – recent NATO members);
- 80% of the 2005 action plan was implemented by national and local governmental bodies on a budget provided by donors.

### *Political reasons*

- Ukrainian leaders declare their desire to see the country a NATO member in Brussels and Washington D.C. but tend to avoid the issue domestically, partially based on the fear that overt public support will lead to a drop in approval ratings (during elections and after).
- During the 2004 presidential elections, an extensive anti-NATO propaganda campaign was executed, which contributed to a sharp decline in public support for NATO membership.

### *The information playing field*

- Isolation, with information flowing primarily from Moscow (particularly in Eastern Ukraine);

### *Information program flaws*

- The state program does not include provisions for specific socio-demographic categories (age, welfare, and region). The program was approved because it had to be approved. But it failed to describe concrete steps to be taken in the course of the campaign that was essentially rubber-stamped.

### *Public Opinion*

- Negative NATO stereotypes have been fostered over a long period of time: since the alliance was formed. The negative stereotypes are enduring and constantly reinforced (as a continuation of the Great Patriotic War) and it is hard to overcome them.



### *Poor media coverage*

- Information is sporadic appearing mostly as reports about "anniversary events" (signing ceremonies, official visits).
- Very little information about current NATO activities;
- Lack of unbiased and objective analytical programs about national security on television, radio and in the press;
- Leading channels seldom discuss NATO-Ukraine relations.

Experts said that a poorly implemented informational campaign poses a significant threat to the country's NATO aspirations because:

- The decision to join or not to join may be left to a nationwide referendum; therefore, more than 50% of popular support is needed;
- If the status quo is maintained, the chances of successfully convincing the Ukrainian population will not be very high. There will be no breakthrough.

Experts did note that similar starting positions (i.e. low public support for NATO membership) were overcome by a number of countries. But the success of the information campaign was the key to generating public support for membership. Thus, the information campaign in Ukraine must also be successful in order to produce the same results.

When devising **the content of the information campaign** expert opinion suggests that certain topics require elucidation:

### *Objective information about the Alliance*

- The purpose of the North Atlantic alliance today and its short, mid, and long-term prospects for development;
- NATO as a political organization, as an organization for collective defense (the structure of the bloc, its functions and tasks);
- Sufficient information about the cooperative processes occurring within the Alliance;
- Different types of NATO peacekeeping missions;
- How NATO functions during times of peace;
- Arguments aimed at debunking old myths (i.e. NATO as aggressive bloc; joining is very expensive; we are a poor nation that will never be truly accepted in the club of rich nations, etc);
- **Informational campaign focus** – NATO standards are built on democratic values: respect for other nations and for human rights. When people understand that there is are "equal signs" between Europe, NATO and these values, then the path to NATO will be smoother as the optimal path of defending one's interests.

### *New Country NATO members*

- Membership in NATO is a priority for an absolute majority of countries in the region. Of the eight countries neighboring Ukraine, five are already members of the Alliance;
- Not a single country that acceded to NATO has ever declared its displeasure with membership; on the contrary, after accession the number of fans of NATO membership increased;
- Not a single influential political party of new member countries has expressed a desire to leave the Alliance;

- In most post-socialist countries, the number of NATO supporters is higher than the number of pro-EU supporters;
- Stress the new Slavic face of NATO, which today includes 5 Slavic countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Slovenia.
- Emphasize that NATO includes two Orthodox Christian countries (Bulgaria and Greece);
- Analyze the problems other countries faced while acceding to NATO;
- **Informational campaign focus** – New country NATO members’ experience of the past five years and expose the absence of negative consequences while underscoring the positive ones.

#### *Ukraine – NATO issues*

- Describe the present state of relations between Ukraine and NATO;
- Describe the prospective relations between Ukraine and NATO;
- Information about the military aspect of our cooperation emphasizing the effective reforms in the Ukrainian army (this will provide an opportunity to increase the number of supporters for NATO membership among those who do not support the idea of having mandatory military service);
- Information about the humanitarian and social aspects of cooperation. Of the 25 joint NATO projects being implemented by Ukraine, 18 are related to ecological threats, technological disasters, etc.
- **Informational campaign focus** – demonstrate NATO’s practical programs in Ukraine (re-qualification of military personnel; flood relief in Zakarpattya; sapping anti-personnel mines and old armaments with the assistance of NATO etc.).

#### *Principles and priorities of accession*

- We are joining NATO not because of pressure from Washington or Moscow, but instead are basing membership on our own interests, considering what is simply rational and beneficial;
- NATO membership is beneficial for us and safe
- NATO membership is the shortest path for Ukraine to join Europe;
- Joining NATO will make it impossible for Russia to apply political and economic pressure on Ukraine;
- Joining NATO will give Ukraine the most dependable guarantee of security;
- **Informational campaign focus** – translate membership arguments from abstract formulations into the language of individual family advantages (Not everyone understands why a threat may come from Russia and this is why it is necessary to reform the popular understanding of the Ukrainian army among citizens, even among those with a very weak understanding of the Ukrainian army’s purpose.).

#### *Analysis of sources of apprehension*

Refuting unsubstantiated criticisms, for example:

- NATO does not require the delegation of a country’s sovereignty to a supranational organ;
- Membership in NATO gives a country leeway to pursue its own policies. Not a single member country can be forced to participate in one or another military or peacekeeping mission if their government and parliament do not approve. (Provide

more information about countries that have their own policy in NATO, for example France);

Argumentation regarding substantiated apprehensive views:

- **Informational campaign focus** – provide public information about the problems that may be encountered during the accession process (financial and military) while emphasizing the long- term gains.

#### *The future place of Ukraine in NATO*

- The potential role Ukraine can play in the transformation of the Alliance (and the costs new roles will entail).

In determining **how to conduct the campaign**, experts noted that it should be **organized, directed and controlled at the highest level** of the leadership of our country. Its general characteristics must be:

- All segments of the national mass media should be engaged in a multi-faceted and comprehensive manner: the press, radio, television and the Internet.
- Systematization on a national level. It would be worthwhile to create a joint center for informing the public that would include state, civic, party and religious informational structures that support the idea of NATO membership for Ukraine with the aim of developing dialog.
- Coordinate the conduct of the informational campaign with international and national outlets.

The state information program must be reviewed to identify what special activities should be disseminated, as well as those that are not necessary, as well as when they have to be carried out (for example, the state program mandates publicizing visits of NATO delegations in the media).

Regarding concrete aspects of campaign implementation, experts propose the following:

#### *Financial support*

- The general amount of financing has to be considerable (equal to the costs of a presidential candidate's election campaign);
- Considering the project's long-term nature, the main thing is not to earmark large costs, but to allocate them regularly and over a longer period;
- Finances must first and foremost come from Ukrainian sources (state finances, finances of separate interested structures);
- The campaign must not only use state resources, but also resources of business and representatives of different media-empires that must show their civic consciousness. The state should convince them to contribute to such a cause;
- The campaign must also be publicly carried out by NATO as well as and non-governmental organizations financed by NATO.

#### *Educational support*

- To understand the nature of current anti-NATO views and dominant stereotypes;
- Taking into consideration the complexity of breaking old stereotypes, create and present new stereotypes;

- Using interactive and public discussions, engage erudite people who can objectively and convincingly show what the North Atlantic alliance is and what Ukraine gains by joining this organization as well as what it loses if it fails.
- Engage specialists in the area of psychological influence on the masses (professional image makers, social psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, public relations specialists etc.).

#### *Civic organizations*

The campaign must include:

- The activity of expert structures whose goal is to objectively research the process of Ukraine's integration into the Alliance and provide the appropriate information to expert target audiences;
- The activities of civic organizations that have as their goal popularizing NATO on a wide scale.

#### *Course of the information campaign*

- *Educational* – foresees the realization of appropriate educational programs in schools, universities, and institutions of higher education like various courses, seminars, and others;
- *Informational* – disseminating information about NATO to the public (through the mass media, dialog with people).

#### *Strategy for providing information*

Expert opinion was divided concerning strategy. Those who felt that accession to NATO is a far off prospect viewed the campaign as purely *informational*: one that does not require *campaigning but simple educational work*.

The advocates of accession in the immediate future see the campaign as one of proactive canvassing. They propose a *controlled-radical* program-campaign as well as an *aggressive-offensive* variant.

Supporters of the longer term explanatory approach argued that open propaganda will alienate the population. Adherents of an active campaign argued that providing information is simply not enough and that the masses must be engaged.

The general principles of campaign implementation are independent from the various modes of delivery. They include:

- Openness – address all the issues with all stakeholders in an open way, so that people themselves draw conclusions concerning the advantages and disadvantages of membership;
- Discussion – those who are for and against must be involved in the discussion;
- Objectiveness – do not be silent on the difficulties and do not try to trick the people;
- Ban on non-argumentative propaganda;
- The information campaign must be carried out in a way that is not overbearing and very peaceful given the current low public support for NATO membership; information about Russia-NATO relations should be provided with the same frequency as news about Ukraine-NATO relations, so that NATO membership is not perceived as a threat to Russian interests.

### *The campaign must be*

- Widespread - covering all regions and strata of Ukraine;
- Strong and consistent - more informational materials should be included in newspapers, television programs and radio);
- Understandable for the public - it must appeal not to abstract national interests or geopolitical schemes but to the individual interests of Ukrainian citizens, and show them the benefits of NATO membership to the economic development and avoidance of war in the region;
- Reinforced by celebrities - the information campaign must engage influential and well-known politicians, academicians, civic activists, athletes, artists, etc;
- Differentiated with regard to the country's socio-demographics.

### *Experience working with target groups*

Experts noted that activities must be developed specifically for each demographic target group with tailored approaches and arguments.

### *Priority Target Groups:*

- Undecided segment of the population;
- "Timid" NATO membership supporters;
- Political elite - they must be confident and convinced that they are making the right decision;
- Youth - inasmuch as they are the least "infected" by Cold War stereotypes and are likely to be interested in the new opportunities provided by alliance membership;
- The segment the intelligentsia in most frequent contact with the average population (teachers, doctors);
- Military personnel;
- Businessmen;
- School children (the Baltic countries discovered that when a child is interested in a particular theme, they in turn engage 3 to 5 adults);
- Inhabitants of Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

### **Target groups, that should be avoided (opponents of accession to NATO)**

- Pensioners;
- Hominis Sovieticus – those who "still live in the Soviet times".

### *Domestic political environment*

Several experts noted that the campaign cannot be effective during election campaigns and must be rolled out during periods of national stability.

### *NATO's internal environment*

The information campaign in Ukraine must be structured in the following stages:

- The first stage runs through 2006 and continues until a historic NATO summit is held where, sooner rather than later, a number of historic decisions will be made. They will be focused on changes to the NATO decision-making system and the change in format of NATO financing arrangements.
- The second stage should start right after the completion of the 2006 NATO summit and continue to the end of April 2007 which should coincide with Ukraine joining the Plan of Activities regarding its membership in the North Atlantic alliance.

- The third stage will precede the 2008 NATO summit where matters regarding the accession of new countries, among them possibly Ukraine, will be discussed.

*Direct application of best practices stemming from the information campaigns used in countries that are new members of NATO.*

- Experts gave high marks to and recommend the use of experience gained by new member countries. However, they emphasized that the size and complexity of the campaign in Ukraine will not allow similar results by simply copying the methods and means of their campaigns.

*Enriching the informational space*

- Experts emphasized the importance of Euro News being available in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages in the Ukrainian informational environment.

*Ukrainian language original written by:*

***Olena Zlobina***

***Director of Social Psychology Studies***

***Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine***

***Doctor of Sociology***

**List of Experts Surveyed for "Ukraine's Place in NATO"  
September 22 - October 30 and December 13-20, 2005**

- |                           |                          |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Appolonov Oleksandr    | 2. Badrak Valentyn       |
| 3. Bodruk Oleh            | 4. Burakovsky Ihor       |
| 5. Vydrin Dmytro          | 6. Vitrenko Andriy       |
| 7. Herasymchuk Serhiy     | 8. Honchar Mykhailo      |
| 9. Honcharenko Oleksandr  | 10. Horbach Volodymyr    |
| 11. Grechaninov Vadym     | 12. Demenko Oleksandr    |
| 13. Demchuk Pavlo         | 14. Dergachov Oleksandr  |
| 15. Dzherdzh Serhiy       | 16. Dubovyk Volodymyr    |
| 17. Zhovkva Ihor          | 18. Zamiatin Viktor      |
| 19. Zarubinsky Oleh       | 20. Zhurets Serhiy       |
| 21. Kazenko Pavlo         | 22. Kalenychenko Ruslan  |
| 23. Kanana Petro          | 24. Koval Oleksiy        |
| 25. Koziy Ihor            | 26. Kokoshynsky Oleh     |
| 27. Kolomiets Oleksiy     | 28. Koriak Volodymyr     |
| 29. Kostina Natalia       | 30. Kravchenko Volodymyr |
| 31. Kulish Andriy         | 32. Lee Svitlana         |
| 33. Lisnychuk Oles        | 34. Lubkivsky Markian    |
| 35. Marcynovsky Anatoliy  | 36. Mitrofanova Oksana   |
| 37. Morozov Kostiantin    | 38. Murakhovsky Anatoly  |
| 39. Nahirny Volodymyr     | 40. Nebozhenko Viktor    |
| 41. Ordynovych Andriy     | 42. Pavlenko Iryna       |
| 43. Paliy Oleksandr       | 44. Pashynsky Volodymyr  |
| 45. Parakhonsky Borys     | 46. Parkhomenko Natalia  |
| 47. Perepelytsia Hryhoriy | 48. Pysarenko Oleksandr  |
| 49. Pozniakov Oleksiy     | 50. Potiekhin Oleksandr  |
| 51. Poshedin Oleh         | 52. Prystaiko Olena      |
| 53. Syemikov Oleksandr    | 54. Sylina Tetiana       |
| 55. Sokolov Serhiy        | 56. Solodky Serhiy       |
| 57. Soskin Oleh           | 58. Stadilna Yana        |
| 59. Sunhurovsky Mykola    | 60. Sushko Oleksandr     |
| 61. Tolstov Serhiy        | 62. Chaley Valeriy       |
| 63. Chaley Oleksandr      | 64. Chumak Viktor        |
| 65. Sherr James           | 66. Shlinchak Viktor     |
| 67. Shuliar Oksana        | 68. Shcherbak Yuri       |
| 69. Yasniuk Vladislav     |                          |

*Note:* The list of experts, their full titles and individualized responses are included in the Ukrainian language original of the survey available at [www.dif.org.ua](http://www.dif.org.ua) and [www.exitpoll.org.ua](http://www.exitpoll.org.ua)