

“Taking Measure of the Holodomor,” Conference Presentation, Nov. 6, 2013

Session XI: The Holodomor—Responsibility and Redress

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Before I address the question of ‘Responsibility and Redress’, I should preface my remarks by explaining that I researched Gareth Jones’ reporting of the *Holodomor* as a media historian whose previous work has ranged from Tolstoy’s view of war and history to media representations of another group whose genocide has often been denied, namely, American Indians. I came with no preconceived notions about Jones, the famine, or its denial by American journalists like Walter Duranty and Louis Fischer, as well as well-known and influential people like George Bernard Shaw and Édouard Herriot, who were largely responsible for burying the famine beneath a litany of lies.

My first encounter with famine literature was Vasily Grossman’s fictionalization in *Everything Flows*, which eventually led me to Timothy Snyder’s history, *Bloodlands*, in which Gareth Jones is introduced in the opening chapters. Interestingly, both of these works use Herriot’s visit. The former Premier of France visited Ukraine in August 1933. In preparation of his visit to Kiev, food was shipped in and displayed in shop windows; police dispersed the crowds who could only stare and wonder since the shops had been empty all year.¹ When he arrived in Kharkov, Herriot was taken to the Feliks Dzierzynski Children’s Commune, where he was shown children who were healthy, clean, nicely dressed, and well fed. Herriot’s visit was reported by the *New York Times* in which Herriot is quoted as saying, “When one believes that the Ukraine is devastated by famine, allow me to shrug my shoulders.”² Not surprisingly the September 13, 1933, issue of *Pravda* writes that Herriot “categorically contradicted the lies of the bourgeoisie press in connection with a famine in the USSR.”³ Grossman’s version makes use of those newspaper reports. “He was taken to some village, to a collective-farm nursery school, and he asked the children what they’d had for lunch that day. ‘Chicken soup with pies and rice croquettes,’ came the answer. I saw those words with my own eyes, I can see that piece of newspaper [*Pravda*] even now.... Killing millions of people on the quiet and then duping the whole world.”⁴ If nothing else, the coverage of Herriot’s visit illustrates that even a free press can be duped into misrepresenting something as horrendous as a famine.

Up until recently media history was written from the paradigm of the grand narrative. In this paradigm, the course of history was written by the larger-than-life figures who dominate a political or military sphere. More recently, Walter R. Fisher argues that a narrative paradigm provides “a logic for assessing stories, for determining whether or not one *should* adhere to the stories one is encouraged to endorse or to accept as the basis for decisions and actions.”⁵ For Fisher narratives that coincide with good reason will be persuasive while narratives that go against our good reason, even if they are sound arguments, tend not to be persuasive. Narrative

rationality is thus determined by the coherence and fidelity of stories, and those stories are used to create and recreate lives.⁶ In media history, we call this communal creative process collective memory. The famine of 1932-33 constitutes what journalism historian Barbie Zelizer refers to as a “critical incident.”⁷ When employed analytically, the term refers to those moments in which the people within a nation collectively formulate and articulate their cultural identity. As a journalist, Jones produced independent eyewitness testimony about what happened to Ukrainians during this critical incident, providing them with the necessary documentation to shape collective memory around it. As Zelizer explains, “In this view, collective memories pivot on discussions of some kind of critical incident. . . . Critical incidents uphold the importance of discourse and narrative in shaping the community over time.”⁸

The narrative of genocide, which we now know as the Holodomor, was articulated by Professor Raphael Lemkin of Harvard University and author of the United Nations Convention against genocide, who in 1953 addressed a rally of largely American-Ukrainian protestors in New York City marking the twentieth anniversary of the famine. As reported in *The Ukrainian Weekly* Section of *Svoboda*, Lemkin reviewed the fate of millions of Ukrainians who died “victims to the Soviet Russian plan to exterminate as many of them as possible in order to break the heroic Ukrainian national resistance to Soviet Russian rule and occupation and to Communism.”⁹ In the eighty years since the famine, that narrative has also, in one small part, become focused around two attendant campaigns related to the reporting of the famine—to elevate Jones to the status of hero and to strip Duranty of his 1932 Pulitzer Prize.

Jones has rightfully become the linchpin journalist of the Holodomor. By invoking his reporting of the famine, Ukrainians frame distant memories into a more current context. Memories, as Kansteiner suggests, “are at their most collective when they transcend time and space of the events’ original occurrence. As such, they take on a powerful life of their own. . . .”¹⁰ I would argue that collective memory is more powerful when it is constituted on the basis of interpretations of specific texts, in this case the newspaper articles Jones wrote about the Soviet Union based on his trip to Ukraine in March 1933. How we make meaning of past events and the journalists who covered them represents an important component of historical inquiry, one that calls for interpretations that challenge established, tacit assumptions before assigning responsibility.

As I researched Jones and the famine, I was struck by the often conflicting accounts. It soon became clear that no single narrative had achieved coherence and fidelity. Even after the opening of Soviet archives, competing paradigms still offered very differing versions. This was clearly evidenced in an exchange of letters published by Robert Conquest and Mark Tauger in the Spring 1992 issue of *Slavic Review*. In responding to Tauger’s article published the previous year, Conquest argued that “acceptance or non-acceptance of his figures has no bearing on one of the main points that he is arguing: whether or not Stalin used the famine as a terror weapon and whether he so used it against specific territories, notably Ukraine.”¹¹ In response, Tauger argued that “the main issue here, however, seems to be one of inference: the intent of Stalin and Soviet

leadership, which we cannot know until we have complete access to Party Archives.” While Tauger did not dismiss the idea that nationality played a role in the Party’s decision-making, he adamantly held to the idea that their decisions, while an important aspect of the famine, were not its fundamental cause. Further, he dismissed Ukrainian memoir sources because having claimed the 1932 harvest was a good one, “they cannot serve as a basis for determining the causes of the famine” and being disproportionately from Ukraine these sources “give a biased impression of the geography of the famine.”¹²

The two researchers renewed their debate again in the Spring 1994 issue of the same journal. In his second letter, Conquest attacked Tauger’s argument that government action had not concentrated famine on Ukraine and Kuban by presenting official documents from the Russian Archives that showed the deliberate strictures to prevent movement and to return any counter-revolutionary elements to their “places of residence.” He also pointed out that the 1.8 million tons of grain exported would have been enough to prevent mass starvation. His points were that when no official documents are available, “it is absurd not to take into account the evidence of those who describe events at first hand...” and that “failures in judgment and perspective have often produced papers on Soviet matters which are of little real use.”¹³ For his part Tauger countered that “neither the decree itself nor the scale of its enforcement are sufficient to prove that the famine was artificially imposed on Ukraine.” He again refuted the nationality focus by citing the work of V. V. Kondrashin, who interviewed 617 famine survivors in the Volga region and “explicitly refuted Conquest’s argument regarding the nationality focus.”¹⁴

Such polarized arguments did little to advance my understanding of either causes of the famine or the extent of Stalin’s responsibility. The intentionalist or terror famine paradigm argued that the famine was artificially created as a result of the Soviet government’s decision to extract the maximum amount of grain from the most fertile region of Ukraine to finance a program of rapid industrialization, that the famine was employed to punish the peasants through starvation for their sabotage of the 1931 and 1932 harvests, and that the famine was engineered to root out Ukrainian nationalism and its supporters. The low harvest paradigm argued that the methods needed to achieve rapid industrialization—including grain exports to secure foreign credit, demands from the military for grain reserves, and concentration of workers at industrial sites—were key factors that contributed to the severity of the famine, which was exacerbated by climatic conditions, lack of draught power, peasant resistance and successive bad harvests in 1931 and 1932. Each paradigm presented conclusions based on eyewitness testimony (i.e., letters, memoirs, interviews), Soviet economic and agricultural data, census figures and government decrees. Each disputed the other’s findings, delineating flaws that undermine the coherence and fidelity of each other’s paradigm. Interestingly, in 2003, Davies and Wheatcroft cited a letter from Dr. Conquest in which he explained that he no longer held the view that “Stalin purposely inflicted the 1933 famine. No. What I argue is that with the resulting famine imminent, he could have prevented it, but put ‘Soviet interest’ other than feeding the starving first—thus consciously abetting it.”¹⁵

Having reached a point of almost complete impasse, I had to come to terms with my own understanding of the famine and its causes. What proved crucial for me was the eyewitness testimony of journalists like Jones, W. H. Chamberlin, R. W. Barnes, W. Stoneman, and M. Muggeridge. Eyewitnessing has special significance in journalism mythology, for to have been there, to preserve for posterity something of the individual human experience within historical events and conditions gives journalists an authority that no training can impart. One scholar has noted that eyewitnessing “offers members of the journalistic community a way to reference what journalists do, should do and ought not do.”¹⁶ In this way, it governs practice, setting boundaries around which kinds of practice are appropriate and preferred. Equally important, eyewitness evidence is crucial to establish journalistic authority, for as British critic John Carey has observed, “eyewitness evidence makes for authenticity... Eyewitness accounts have the feel of truth, because they are quick, subjective and incomplete.”¹⁷ Indeed, Jones was criticized by Walter Duranty in the *New York Times* for being incomplete. Duranty wrote, “The writer thought Mr. Jones’s judgment was somewhat hasty and asked him on what it was based. It appeared that he had made a forty-mile walk through villages in the neighborhood of Kharkov and had found conditions sad. I suggested that that was a rather inadequate cross-section of a big country, but nothing could shake his conviction of impending doom.”¹⁸

On the surface, Duranty’s criticism seems reasonable. Social science research on eyewitness accounts argues that those accounts can be unreliable when the event has been witnessed infrequently and for a short period of time, when violence has been involved, when a long time has elapsed between witnessing the event and reporting it, or when the witness is under stress at the time of recollection.¹⁹ But eyewitnessing should not be measured merely by the distance covered; in fact, as John Locke noted, what is key is the witness’ proximity to the event. Jones got as close as he could to the people: he slept in their huts, he spoke directly with them, recording them in his reporter’s notebooks/diaries, and they shared with him the little food they had and he shared with them what little food he had packed in his rucksack.

Most importantly, Jones gave voice to people who in all likelihood would not survive the famine. Only by keeping their experiences alive through the discursive act of writing his newspaper articles did Jones assure access to truth and authenticity. Herein lies the difference between fact and fiction. John Durham Peters noted, “In tragedy, the representation of pain (and pain is definitional for the genre) is not supposed to excite the spectator to humanitarian service but to clarify through representation what is possible in life. The drama offers terror without danger, pity without duty.... Factual distress calls for our aid, not our appreciation; our duty, not our pleasure.”²⁰ The boundary between fact and fiction is an ethical one; it demands respect, or bearing witness, to the pain of victims.

Jones’ eyewitness reporting of the famine, like any eyewitness testimony, was not without flaws, and many questions have yet to be answered. For example, where exactly in Ukraine did he walk? Why are there two mentions of entering Ukraine (Illustration 1) in his diary? Where and when was he arrested and why was he delivered to the German consulate in Kharkov? Why was

his passport not confiscated? What about his relationship with W. R. Hearst whose campaign against the Communist Party in early 1935 and publication of Robert Green's (aka Thomas Walker), fraudulent reporting of the famine cast doubt on the honest reporting of Jones, Chamberlin, Muggeridge, Barnes and Stoneman?

If Jones' eyewitness reporting is crucial to confirming the famine, it must be considered in light of other contemporaneous independent sources. The most important non-journalistic source was arguably Andrew Cairns, the Canadian wheat expert who in 1932 traveled extensively through Western Siberia in May and June; Ukraine, Crimea, and North Caucasus in June-July; and the Volga region in mid-August. Cairns' reports, which have been published by the Canadian Center for Ukrainian Studies, call into question Jones' assertion about favorable climatic conditions in 1932. Jones did not travel to the USSR in 1932. In addition to his travels, Cairns cited the testimony of Professor N. M. Tulaikov, who had made a tour of the region in June and July, and said that "in the upper half of the left side of the Volga ... the crops looked fine, but he motored over the whole country in mid-July and found that the drought and hot winds of late June and early July had practically ruined the crop."²¹ Despite differing on the environmental factors that impacted crop yields, Jones and Cairns were in almost complete agreement about every other aspect—people starving in the streets, depleted stocks of seed, large grain exports, idle land, and fields ruined by weeds, rust and ergot, this last point corroborated by Chamberlin during his visit in August 1933.

While Cairns' account of reduced sown acreage, a late planting of spring wheat, and the unusual number of tough weeds in the fields points to a complex of causes, it constitutes only part of the explanation. Discussion of harvests has also considered peasant resistance to Communist Party policies enacted between November 1929 and January 1933.²² While resistance took many different forms at different times, it does not account for those actions that occurred outside the nexus of resistance. Additionally, placing too much emphasis on resistance runs counter to the idea that some work must have been accomplished or there would have been even less food available. As Tauger noted, "In other words, the argument asserts that the majority of peasants attempted to deprive their families and fellow villagers of sufficient food to last until the next harvest."²³

Data from the Soviet Agricultural Archives should be neither overlooked completely, nor accepted as absolute fact. In a 1930 article for *The Times*, Jones asserts that statistics concealed poor materials, failure to provide factories with raw materials, and the destruction of expensive imported machinery through carelessness. Additionally, Cairns travelled extensively with Otto Schiller, the German agricultural attaché in Moscow, whose reports corroborate what Cairns witnessed. Schiller described for Cairns how the Soviets compiled three sets of statistics.

Later he [Schiller] told me that he had been informed confidentially by an official of the Department of Agriculture in Moscow, a man in a position to know the facts, that the maximum spring sowing they expected this year [1932] was about 82 to 84 per cent of

the plan and that a number of the officials thought that to expect even 82 percent was insane optimism, and that not more than 70 percent of the plan would be fulfilled. He said all Russian statistics are compiled in three sets—one for publication, one confidential set for the directors, and one very confidential set for the very high officials. The Government would not, he argued, weaken its prestige by publishing figures showing that the plan as a whole had not been carried out by less than about 90 percent no matter what the truth might be.²⁴

The three sets of statistics point to the difficulties independent observers and journalists experienced in making sense of the disaster. In terms of any interpretation of statistical data, one pervasive bias in decisions about what information is most relevant or credible is the tendency to regard information that is consistent with one's *a priori* theories as the worthiest pieces of information. Thus when one is testing a theory about the nature, causes, or outcome of an event like the famine, the information that will be selected as most useful is often information that is consistent with and confirming of one's theory while that which does not confirm one's theory is disregarded.²⁵

What finally coalesced for me was a narrative in which terror-famine and low harvest data are not polar opposites, one necessarily disproving the other. If, as Tauger argues, there was indeed less grain in the autumn and winter of 1932, then the policies enacted by Stalin and the Politburo—including exports, murderous grain quotas, passportization, closing of the borders, and an assault on Ukrainian nationalism—all point to genocide. Perhaps the most telling indication that an ideological change was being effected was a diary entry Jones made on March 16, his last day in Kharkov (Illustration 2). He writes: “New Ukrainian policy. In the last few weeks there has been a beginning of Russification system. Moscovites have been placed in leading positions in Kharkov and now Russian is to be taught in the schools.”²⁶ Jones used much of this material in an article for the *Western Mail*, titled “OGPU’s Reign of Terror in Russia,” in which he points to the return of Genrikh Grigoryevich Yagoda, who had overseen construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal 1931-1933 using forced labor from the Gulag system with huge casualties, as the person responsible for carryout renewed terror on all fronts—party members, intelligentsia, peasants, and Ukrainian nationalists. This along with a Politburo resolution approved on December 14, 1932, attempted to connect the policy of Ukrainisation with the failure of grain collections. The resolution made it a crime to be “unsupportive of Soviet power” and resulted in exile or execution, depending on the severity of the charge. Moreover, nationalism was portrayed in Communist Party propaganda as part of a kulak web of anti-Soviet wrecking by counter-revolutionary non-Russian minorities that had to be stamped out. In several articles, Jones expressed the idea that nationalist movements might seize the opportunity presented by the famine to revolt, but he underestimated the power that Stalin already possessed and the demonic lengths of his repression.

Jones was not the only journalist who noted this attack on Ukrainian nationalism. William H. Chamberlin also articulated this point in his memoir, *Russia’s Iron Age*.

Of the historic responsibility of the Soviet Government for the famine of 1932-1933 there can be no reasonable doubt. In contrast to its policy in 1921-1922, it stifled any appeal for foreign aid by denying the very fact of the famine and by refusing to foreign journalists the right to travel in the famine regions until it was all over. Famine was quite deliberately employed as an instrument of national policy, as the last means of breaking resistance of the peasantry to the new system where they are divorced from personal ownership of the land and obliged to work on conditions which the state may dictate to them and deliver up whatever the state may demand from them.²⁷

It is arguably much easier to assign responsibility for the famine than to delineate its causes. The narrative which has evolved after eighty years of earnest scholarship is one of complexity, as articulated by Dr. Alexander Motyl, whose assessment of the Holodomor was titled “Looking at the Holodomor through the lens of the Holocaust.” This article was published in a book edited by Lubomyr Luciuk and in *The Ukrainian Weekly*. Dr. Motyl writes: “Understanding the Holodomor, therefore means viewing it just as we view the Holocaust – as a complex and multi-layered phenomenon produced by, and comprehensible only in terms of, an exceedingly complex ideological, political and imperial context. In other words, it’s as incorrect to think of the Holodomor as a single occurrence confined to one time and place and whose victims experienced the same exact death at the hands of the same exact perpetrators as it’s incorrect to view the Holocaust in this manner.”²⁸

Finally, I could not end this discussion about responsibility without directing attention to the *New York Times*. While there’s no question that Walter Duranty was the obvious villain who denigrated Jones by name and denied the famine, I argue that the *New York Times* is equally culpable. In 2003, Arthur Sulzberger Jr., publisher of the *New York Times*, commended the Pulitzer Prize board’s decision not to rescind Duranty’s 1932 prize, noting the “many defects”²⁹ in Duranty’s journalism without acknowledging the newspaper’s culpability in creating misleading headlines, publishing editorials that euphemistically referred to famine as “food shortages” while blaming the famine on the peasants, and giving prominence to Duranty’s famine-denying stories. The newspaper issued apologies to victims of the famine; however, while it may “regret his [Duranty’s] lapses,”³⁰ it has neither acknowledged its own part in disseminating famine denial stories, nor apologized to the family of Gareth Jones for the public denigration. On its website, the company ended a statement explaining the 1932 Pulitzer Prize awarded to Duranty by noting that the *New York Times* “does not have the award in its possession.”³¹ Presumably, that absolves the newspaper of meeting its ethical obligation and returning the 1932 Pulitzer Prize.

Evidence shows that the newspaper was itself complicit in duping the public. In a memorandum dated June 4, 1931, A. W. Kliefoth, a member of the U.S. Berlin Embassy, summarized a meeting he had with Duranty (Illustration 3). The final sentence of the memorandum reads: “In conclusion, Duranty pointed out that ‘in agreement with NEW YORK TIMES and the Soviet authorities,’ his dispatches always reflect the official position of the Soviet regime and not his

own.”³² The series that Duranty wrote about the Five-Year Plan for which he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize ran from June 14-27, 1931, only ten days after this meeting. Significantly, Kliefoth was careful to quote Duranty directly regarding the crucial point about the agreement between the *New York Times* and Soviet authorities. That the *New York Times* was negligent in its reliance on correspondents like Walter Duranty is absolutely clear. In 1920, Walter Lippmann and Charles Metz analyzed the newspaper’s coverage of the Russian Revolution in a special supplement for *The New Republic* titled “A Test of the News.” Lippmann and Mertz warned that the newspaper did not take seriously enough the equipment of the correspondent. They write:

For extraordinary difficult posts in extraordinary times, something more than routine correspondents are required. Reporting is one of the most difficult professions, requiring much expert knowledge and serious education. The old contention that properly trained men lack the “news sense” will not stand against the fact that improperly trained men have seriously misled a whole nation.³³

Unfortunately, the *New York Times* allowed its improperly trained man to denigrate Gareth Jones, whose “expert knowledge and serious education” uniquely equipped him to report on this catastrophic event. As long as the *New York Times* fails to acknowledge its repugnant actions, the denigration of Gareth Jones and the victims of the Holodomor continues. Thank you.

Notes

1. See Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 57-58.
2. “Herriot Scoffs at Famine Talk,” *New York Times*, 18 September 1933, 8.
3. Quoted in Étienne Thevenin, “France, Germany and Austria: Facing the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine,” James Mace Memorial Panel, IAUS Congress, Donetsk, Ukraine, 29 June 2005, 8.
4. See Vasily Grossman, *Everything Flows*, trans. by Robert Chandler, Elizabeth Chandler, and Anna Aslanyan (New York: New York Review of Books, 2009), 132.
5. Walter R. Fisher, “The Narrative Paradigm: An Elaboration,” *Communication Monographs*, Vol. 52, (December 1985), 348.
6. *Ibid.*, 355.
7. Barbie Zelizer, *Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media, and the Shaping of Collective Memory* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 4.
8. *Ibid.* See also Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 259. Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). Levi-Strauss described “hot moments” as events through which a society assesses its own

significance. Michel de Certeau explains in *The Writing of History* that these incidents constitute projections by the individuals or groups who give them meaning in discourse.

9. "Over 15,000 N.Y. Ukrainian Americans March in Protest Parade Marking Anniversary of Soviet Fostered 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine," *Svoboda—The Ukrainian Weekly Section*, September 26, 1953, 1.

10. Wulf Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies," *History and Theory*, 41 (May 2002), 189.

11. Robert Conquest, "Letter to the Editor," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), 192.

12. Mark B. Tauger, "Professor Tauger Replies," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), 194.

13. Robert Conquest, "Letter to the Editor," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), 318.

14. Mark B. Tauger, "Prof. Tauger Replies," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), 319.

15. Quoted in R. W. Davies & Stephen G. Wheatcroft, "Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33: A Reply to Ellman," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 4, (June 2006), 629.

16. B. Zelizer, "On Having Been There: Eyewitnessing as a Journalistic Key Word," *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 24 (5), 410.

17. Quoted in B. Zelizer, "On Having Been There: Eyewitnessing as a Journalistic Key Word," *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 24 (5), 411.

18. Walter Duranty, "Russians Hungry, But Not Starving," *New York Times*, 31 March 1933, 13.

19. Holly Stocking and Paget H. Gross, "Understanding Errors, Biases that Can Affect Journalists," *Educator*, (Spring 1989), 4.

20. John Dunham Peters, 'Witnessing', in *Media Witnessing: Testimony in the Age of Mass Communication*. Eds. Paul Frosh and Amit Pinchevski. Houndmills, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 39.


21. Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan, eds., *The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933* (Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press, 1988), 190-91.

22. See D'Ann Penner, "The Agrarian Strike of 1932-33," Occasional Papers. The Woodrow Wilson Center, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (1998).

23. Mark B. Tauger, "Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931-33," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies*, No. 1506, June 2001, 27.

24. Andrew Cairns, *The Soviet Famine, 1932-33: An Eye-witness Account of Conditions in the Spring and Summer of 1932*, Tony J. Kuz, ed. (Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta Press, 1989), 38.
25. Stocking and Gross, "Understanding Errors," 7.
26. Gareth Jones, *Diary of Tour of Russia, March 1933*. Gareth Vaughan Jones Papers, National Library of Wales. File B1/13. Diary 2, Part 1, 20.
27. William H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1934), 88-89.
28. Alexander J. Motyl, "Looking at the Holodomor through the Lens of the Holocaust," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, July 27, 2008, Vol. LXXVI, No. 30, 7. See also, "Looking at the Holodomor through the Lens of the Holocaust," in Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, ed. *Holodomor: Reflections on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine* (Kingston, Canada: Kashtan Press, 2008).
29. David D. Kirkpatrick, "Pulitzer Board Won't Void '32 Award to Times Writer," *New York Times*, 22 November 2003, A13.
30. Ibid.
31. "New York Times Statement About 1932 Pulitzer Prize Awarded to Walter Duranty." Accessed from <http://www.nytc.com/company/awards/statement.html>.
32. A. W. Kliehoth, "Memorandum," US Embassy in Berlin. Accessed from <http://www.garethjones.org/Embassy-1.pdf>.
33. Walter Lippman and Charles Merz, "A Test of the News," *The New Republic*, 4 August 1920, 42.

Illustrations



Then on to the
 railway as on to Ukraine.
 Wagon - oil, timber,
 towards the S.
 Most important
 railway in Russia,
 Nov in Ukraine.
 790 bail fags

Illustration 1: Diary entries from March 11, 1933, detailing Gareth Jones' crossing into Ukraine.

The GPU is getting
 more & more powerful.
 Stalin & GPU now
 only Russia.
 There is a struggle
 between the NKVD and
 GPU - an old
 conflict, but ~~the GPU~~
~~has~~ but NKVD
 has nothing to say.

New Ukrainian
 Policy. In last few weeks
 there has been a beginning
 of Russification again.
 Crossroads have been
 placed in dead points
 - Kharkov & more
 Russia is to be

Illustration 2: Diary entry from March 16, 1933, detailing the "New Ukrainian policy" and Russification.

initiated by Russia. In conclusion, Duranty pointed out that, "in agreement with the NEW YORK TIMES and the Soviet authorities," his official despatches always reflect the official opinion of the Soviet régime and not his own.

A.W.Kliefoth.

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Illustration 3: Memorandum from A. W. Kliefoth explaining the agreement between the *New York Times* and Soviet authorities to publish Duranty's dispatches reflecting the Party line.